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1Introduction
1.1 Background of Climate Change and Emission
Trading
Climate change is happening and will continue over decades to come. There is
broad-based agreement within the scientific community that climate change is
real, and scientists believe that human’s activities, such as burning fossil fuels,
industrial production, agriculture and deforestation, are the main cause of the
current global warming. Actually, climate scientists have increased their under-
standing of the climate system, they are able to state with increasing certainty
that the Earth’s climate has changed beyond historic variability, and that hu-
man’s activities are the main cause. This can be seen from the statements in the
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The fourth IPCC’s Assessment Report published in 2007 states that:
“Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-
20th century is very likely (90% confidence) due to the observed increase in
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”(IPCC 07)
However, in the fifth IPCC’s Assessment Report published in 2013, it con-
cludes that:
“It is extremely likely (95% confidence) more than half of the observed in-
crease in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by
the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthro-
pogenic forcings together.” (IPCC 13)
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The report also states that the greenhouse gas emissions contributed a global
mean surface warming likely to be in the range of 0.5◦C to 1.3◦C over the pe-
riod 1951 to 2010. If we keep the current human activities in a business as
usual (BAU) scenario, the average temperature between 2080 and 2100 is very
likely to be 2.6-4.8◦C higher than today, so predicted the climate scientists in
this report. Moreover, continued carbon emissions in the atmosphere will drive
further heatwaves, sea level rise, melting ice and extreme weather. Therefore,
to avoid the worst consequences of global warming, cutting substantial and sus-
tained anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is required. This environmental
issue is a significant challenge for the policy makers.
Research on policy instruments of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions
begins in the sixties of the twentieth century. In the last 50 years, different pos-
sible solutions are widely studied and practiced. Basically, there are two main
environmental policy instruments available to be implemented: the regulatory
instrument and the marked-based instrument (MBI).
The regulatory instrument, also called the command and control regulation
(CAC), can be defined as the direct regulation of an industry or activity by
legislation that states what is permitted and what is illegal. (McMa 09) The
command means that the standards by a government authority that must be
complied with, while control signifies negative sanctions that may result from
non-compliance. (BaCL 11) For the issue of reducing the greenhouse gas emis-
sions, this means that the government sets legal limits on emission levels and
controls the manner in which it is achieved. In practice, the command and
control regulation is argued not as effective as a market-based approach, be-
cause emission sources diffuse and it is usually not possible for a command and
control approach to be implemented in a cost efficient way. A simple example
can be described as follows: it is relatively easy to regulate the emissions from
10 large coal burning power stations in a single country, but far less easy to
monitor the emissions caused by millions of motorists or the eﬄuent discharges
from tens of thousands of farms across the world. (Evan 12)
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By way of contrast, a market-based instrument differs from a command and
control instrument and provides more flexibility and effectiveness on reducing
the greenhouse gases. A market-based instrument is defined as instruments or
regulations that encourage behavior through market signals rather than through
explicit directives. (HoSW 97) An environmental market-based approach uses
markets, prices, and other economic variables to provide incentives for pol-
luters to reduce or eliminate emissions. There are three types of market-based
instruments on environmental policy:
• A price-based instrument: it alters the prices of goods and services to
reflect their relative impact. For instance, by using taxes, introducing
levies or providing subsidies to reduce emissions.
• A rights-based instrument: it controls the quantity of the environmental
good or service to the socially desired level. For instance, by introducing
a cap-and-trade scheme or offset scheme to achieve an emission reduction
goal. And
• An instrument designed to reduce market friction: it aims to stimulate a
market to produce a desired environmental outcome through improving
the workings of existing markets by reducing transaction costs or im-
proving information flows. For instance, substantial gains can be made in
environmental protection by removing existing explicit or implicit barriers
to market activity.
These instrument types and their applications are shown in Figure 1.1.
Compared with the regulatory instrument, the market-based instrument has
its notable advantages on achieving the climate goal. First, such an MBI instru-
ment is more cost effective than the CAC approach. In theory, if designed and
implemented properly, the market-based instrument can achieve the emission
reduction targets most cheaply and equalize the incremental amount that emit-
ters spend to reduce pollution, rather than equalizing pollution levels among
all emitters. The spend of these emitters is also called the marginal abatement
cost. Second, the market-based instrument offers dynamic incentives for tech-
nology innovation. By applying the MBIs, powerful incentives can be provided
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Figure 1.1: Types of environmental policy instruments and their appli-
cations
for companies to adopt cheaper and better technologies to reduce their emis-
sions or even use clean technologies to avoid emissions. For more theoretical
analysis on the advantages of MBIs, see for example: (OaPM 89), (DowW 86),
and (JuKB 96). Studies on the characteristics and comparison of these instru-
ments can be read in (BauO 88), (Tiet 95).
This thesis mainly focuses on the cap-and-trade system, i.e. the emission
trading scheme, as it is nowadays widely applied over the globe and has become
the most popular approach used by the policy makers to their environmental
policy. Under a cap-and-trade principle, a cap will be set on the total amount
of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by installations or companies covered
by the system. Within the cap, companies with allocated or purchased tradable
permits can sell or buy them to each other. At the end of each trading period,
any company who does not have sufficient permits to cover its total emissions
must face a penalty. The limit on the total number of tradable permits ensures
that they have a value, and these permits can be traded as a commodity.
As an early example, the first launch of an emission trading system is in
the USA. In 1995, a sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission trading system under the
framework of the Acid Rain Program of the 1990 Clean Air Act in the U.S.
is established. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is
the world’s first multinational cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases. It
is launched in 2005 and remains the world’s biggest emission trading system.
4
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As of 2016, it covers more than 11,000 heavy energy-using installations in all
28 EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The system is now
responsible for around 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. In 2008,
the Chinese government announced to establish the Chinese emission trading
scheme as part of its strategy to create a low carbon civilization. From 2013 to
2015, 7 pilot emission trading schemes were launched in different provinces and
cities in China as a part of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan which ran from 2011 to
2015. A national ETS is planned to be established in 2017 during the China’s
13th Five-Year Plan which runs from 2016 to 2020. With the establishment
of the Chinese national ETS, it will be potentially the world’s largest emis-
sion trading system, which will cover around 50% of total domestic emissions.
Meanwhile, other developed and developing countries have already or are plan-
ning to set their domestic and reginal emission trading systems. Some of them
are discussing to link their trading systems together. When using the emission
trading schemes, the carbon price, i.e. the price must be paid for the right to
emit one tonne of CO2 into the atmosphere, is the key factor for a functional
and operational system, and therefore will be the main research objective in
this thesis.
1.2 Motivation of the Thesis
The motivation of this thesis consists of two separate parts. First, pricing of
emission allowances and its relating derivatives plays significant role in the emis-
sion trading systems. Different pricing models for allowance price have been
developed in recent years, only a few are useful on determining its correspond-
ing derivatives. To price options on emission certificates, reduced-form models
are proved to be useful. The aim of the thesis is to develop an option pricing
model, which captures more market information. To achieve this goal, it is ne-
cessary to investigate a reduced-form model as the first step, then an extended
pricing model will be developed based on the reduced-form model to extract
information on the market price of risk and evaluate its impact on option prices
of carbon permits.
5
1. INTRODUCTION
Second, linking two emission trading systems on a global scale has become
a more important issue. This has been discussed by many key market play-
ers (e.g. Europe-Switzerland, China- other Asian countries, China-Europe)
and could be realized any time in an international momentum on reducing the
global greenhouse gas emissions, especially after the 21st Conference of Parties
(COP 21) in 2015, in which the Paris Agreement is adopted. The aim of this
thesis is to investigate the price behavior under the linking mechanism. Using a
static equilibrium model, it is possible to show that prices of emission permits
in different trading schemes, either under a unilateral or a bilateral condition,
will converge to a single price.
In order to solve the two problems mentioned above, it is necessary to un-
derstand the background and mechanism of the carbon market as the first step.
The regulatory framework of international carbon market will be introduced
first in this thesis, then the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU
ETS). The background of international linking systems and their status will be
specified as well.
1.3 Contribution and Structure of the Thesis
This thesis provides the following contributions:
1 Analysis of important international climate agreements of UNFCCC, in-
cluding Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement:
a) Illustrate how the carbon market mechanism of Kyoto Protocol looks
like and what changes in the post-Kyoto period.
b) Analyze the Paris Agreement and its possible impact on the climate
change after 2020.
c) Compare both Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement and show how
they related to each other.
2 Analysis of EU ETS mechanism and the reform of EU ETS in the current
and subsequent trading phases:
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a) Introduce how the basic mechanism of EU ETS looks like and illus-
trate how the system could be functional for trading emissions and
achieving the emission reduction target.
b) Analyze the reform of EU ETS and its impact on the on-going and
subsequent trading phases.
3 Analysis of the carbon allowance price dynamics in a risk neutral frame-
work:
a) Explain the EUA futures price behavior theoretically.
b) Develop a new stochastic model to capture more market information.
c) Test both the original model and the new developed model and dis-
cuss their results.
d) Apply the new model to price EUA options.
e) Discuss carbon permit pricing methods by modelling the cumulative
emission process.
4 Analysis of carbon linking systems on an international scale:
a) Introduce the background of international carbon markets and their
outlook.
b) Discuss the possibility of international linking system of emission
trading markets.
c) Conduct equilibrium analysis on linking systems under different mar-
ket settings.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 is the introduction, which pro-
vides background, motivation and contribution of the thesis. Chapter 2 begins
with the international regulatory framework on climate change and the most
important decisions on stabilizing the greenhouse gas emissions. Two major
milestones in the 21-year history of the global climate negotiations were made:
The Kyoto Protocol in 1997 placed a limit on emissions to developed countries
and the Paris Agreement in 2015 set out a roadmap in post-2020 to keep the
world’s temperature increase under a certain level. A market-based mechanism
of emission trading is used to achieve the objective of these deals. Its impact
will be analyzed. To act in concert with the international agreements, the Euro-
pean Union established its own system, known as the European Union Emission
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Trading Scheme (EU ETS), to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions for all 28
European nations plus 3 other countries. Chapter 3 introduces the mechanism
of the EU ETS, its trading assets and the price behavior of carbon permits.
It specifies the current problems of the system and its reforms. In Chapter
4, price behavior of the carbon permits of EU ETS will be analyzed quantita-
tively. A reduced-form univariate price model will be introduced and will be
extended into a bivariate model in order to capture more market information.
Once the forwards price is determined, its related option price will be derived
as well. The international background of linking system will be introduced in
Chapter 5 and a static equilibrium model of linking system will be investigated
to illustrate the price behavior in such a system. Finally, key findings of this
thesis and their outlooks will be summarized in Chapter 6. Figure 1.2 shows
the structure of the thesis.
Figure 1.2: Structure of the thesis
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2.1 International Agreement on Climate Change
2.1.1 UNFCCC and IPCC
The effects of global climate change and global warming are becoming more and
more evident. Scientists believe that they are already causing more frequent
occurrences of extreme events such as drought, flooding and rises in malaria.
Other phenomena attributed to climate change are increased incidents of hur-
ricanes and forest fires. For the long-term impact, sea levels are rising, which
could cause damage to crops and lead to wide-spread famine.
Nowadays, it is widely known that global warming is caused by an excess
of heat-trapping gases, first and foremost carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous
oxides. These gases mainly result from the burning of fossil fuels, from indus-
tries and agriculture. The gases prevent the sun’s energy from radiating back
into space after it has reached the surface of the Earth, much like the glass of
a greenhouse. Therefore, how to control greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere has become the key issue in this century.
The UNFCCC, known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, is an international environmental treaty negotiated at the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, then entered into force in 1994. As the
first international agreement on this issue, its objective is to stabilize greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system (UN 92). The UNFCCC
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came into force on 21 March 1994, after having been ratified by 192 nations.
As of November 2016, there are 197 Parties, which include 196 States and 1
regional economic integration organization, to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The UNFCCC is also the name of the United Nations Secretariat charged
with supporting the operation of the Convention. That means, the work un-
der the UNFCCC is facilitated by the secretariat, with its office in Bonn, Ger-
many. And it is headed by the Executive Secretary. The Secretariat, augmented
through the parallel efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), aims to gain consensus through meetings and the discussion of various
climate strategies.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is an intergovern-
mental organization for the assessment of climate change. It was established
in 1988 by two United Nations organizations, the World Meteorological Orga-
nization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
and was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in the same year.
The main task for IPCC is to provide the world with an objective, scientific
view of climate change and its political and economic impacts. Currently, IPCC
contains 195 countries as members, most of them are also members of UNFCCC.
The IPCC does not conduct its own original research on climate change,
nor does it do the work of monitoring climate or related phenomena itself. The
IPCC bases its assessment on the published literature, which includes peer-
reviewed and non-peer-reviewed sources. That means, thousands of scientists
from all over the world contribute to the work of the IPCC. The IPCC reviews
the works to ensure an objective and complete assessment of current informa-
tion can be provided to reflect a range of views and expertise on the issue of
climate change.
The reports of IPCC cover “the scientific, technical and socio-economic in-
formation relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced
climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitiga-
tion”, which is also known as the Principles governing IPCC work (IPCC 06).
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So far, the IPCC has published five comprehensive assessment reports (AR) re-
viewing the latest climate science and the impacts of climate change. The first
assessment report is published in 1990 with a supplementary report in 1992, a
second assessment report (SAR) in 1995, a third assessment report (TAR) in
2001, a fourth assessment report (AR4) in 2007 and a fifth assessment report
(AR5) in 2014. Currently, the IPCC is in its sixth assessment cycle and the
Panel will produce the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) and a series of special
reports. The 43rd Session of the IPCC held in April 2016 agreed that the AR6
Synthesis Report would be finalized in 2022. Each of the Assessment Reports
played a key role in informing decision makers as they shape climate policies
over the next several years, especially for the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the
Paris Agreement in 2015.
2.1.2 History of COP and its achievements
The United Nations Climate Change Conferences are yearly conferences held
in the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). They serve as the formal meeting of the UNFCCC Par-
ties. The Parties to the Convention have to meet annually from 1995 in the
Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate
change. The UNFCCC sets no binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions for
individual nations and contains no enforcement mechanisms itself. Instead, the
framework outlines how specific international treaties, usually called “Proto-
cols” or “Agreements”, can be negotiated to set binding limits on greenhouse
gas emissions. The first binding agreement adopted by the COP is the well-
known Kyoto Protocol during the COP 3 in 1997. From 2005 the Conferences
also served as the Meetings of Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), so that
Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to the Protocol can participate in
Protocol-related meetings as observers. As of 2016, there are four states which
are not Parties to the Protocol: Andorra, Palestine, South Sudan and Holy See.
They served as observers to the CMP, but without the right to take decisions.
In the history of COP, progress has been made step by step on stabilizing
the global warming problem. The first Conferences of the Parties (COP 1) was
11
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held in 1995 in Berlin. Parties agreed that the commitments in the Conven-
tion were “inadequate” for meeting the Convention’s objective. In a decision of
COP, it agreed to establish a process to negotiate strengthened commitments
for developed countries.
COP 3 took place in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. After intensive negoti-
ations, delegates to COP agreed to a protocol to the UNFCCC that committed
industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to
achieve legally binding targets on emission reduction. The Kyoto Protocol was
adopted thereafter. These countries agreed to reduce their overall emissions
of six GHGs by an average of 5% below 1990 levels in 2008-2012 with specific
targets varying from country to country. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol entered
into force on 16 February 2005 and now has 192 Parties.
The 11th COP held in 2005 in Montreal. The COP 11, also known as the
first session of the CMP, established the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Annex
I Parties’ further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with
Protocol Article 3.9, which mandated consideration of Annex I Parties’ further
commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period.
In COP 13 in 2007, a Bali Action Plan was adopted with aim to set a time-
line and structured negotiation on the post-2012 framework, i.e. the post Kyoto
Protocol period. It also established the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action under the Convention, with a mandate to focus on mitiga-
tion, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and a shared vision for
long-term cooperative action.
COP 15 took place in Copenhagen in 2009. The overall goal of the con-
ference was to establish an ambitious global climate agreement for the period
from 2012 when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (2008-
2012) expires. However, the conference did not achieve a binding agreement for
long-term action, only a ‘political accord’ was negotiated by some key players
such as China and USA, and was only ‘noted’ by the COP as it is considered
an external document and would be discussed in the next conference.
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One year later in COP 16, the Cancun Agreements was adopted on estab-
lishing several new institutions and processes. Also the Green Climate Fund
(GCF) was created and designated as an operating entity of the Convention’s
financial mechanism. And Parties agreed to consider the adequacy of the global
long-term goal during a 2013-2015 review.
At COP 17, the Durban outcomes covered a wide range of topics, notably a
decision on long-term cooperative action under the Convention and agreement
on the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Parties also de-
cided to adopt an universal climate agreement no later than 2015, with work
beginning under a new group called the Ad-Hoc working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). The new instrument was plan to enter
into force in 2020.
In 2014 at the COP 20, the Lima Conference was able to lay the ground-
work for Paris by capturing progress made in elaborating the elements of a draft
negotiating text for the 2015 agreement and adopting a decision on Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). It also adopted the Lima Call
for Climate Action, which sets in motion the negotiations towards a 2015 agree-
ment in Paris.
The next Conference in 2015, COP21/CMP11, was held in Paris in De-
cember 2015 and resulted in adoption of the Paris Agreement, which governs
climate change reduction measures from 2020. The Paris Agreement was opened
for signature and then entered into force in November 2016 after some certain
ratification conditions were satisfied. The adoption of this agreement ended
automatically the work of the Durban platform, established during COP17.
The latest conference COP 22 was held in November 2016 in Marrakech,
Morocco. During COP 22, Parties discussed the articles of the Paris Agreement
in more details.
Table 2.1 summaries the pathway of COP and its main achievements in the
history.
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COP Year Place Achievement
COP 1 1995 Berlin,
Germany
Parties voiced concerns about the
adequacy of countries’ abilities to
meet commitments.
COP 2 1996 Geneva,
Switzer-
land
It accepted the scientific findings
on climate change proffered by the
IPCC in its second assessment and
called for legally binding mid-term
targets.
COP 3 1997 Kyoto,
Japan
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted
with legally binding targets on cli-
mate change.
COP 4 1998 Buenos
Aires,
Argentina
Parties adopted a 2-year Plan of
Action to advance efforts and to
devise mechanisms for implement-
ing the Kyoto Protocol.
COP 5 1999 Bonn,
Germany
It was a meeting with focus on the
technical issues of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. No major conclusions were
made.
COP 6 2000 The Hague,
Nether-
lands
Discussions of this COP evolved
rapidly into a high-level negotia-
tion over the major political issues,
but did not reach a consensus.
COP 6 2001 Bonn,
Germany
As the second part of COP 6, Bonn
Agreement was reached with con-
sensus on several issues, notably
the mechanisms land-use change
and forestry (LULUCF) and com-
pliance.
COP 7 2001 Marrakech,
Morocco
Marrakech Accords was made
and included operational rules
for international emissions trading
among Parties to the Protocol and
for the CDM and joint implemen-
tation.
COP 8 2002 New Delhi,
India
The Delhi Ministerial Declaration
was adopted, calling for efforts
by developed countries to transfer
technology and minimize the im-
pact of climate change on develop-
ing countries.
COP 9 2003 Milan,
Italy
It adopted decisions focus on the
institutions and procedures of the
Kyoto Protocol and on the imple-
mentation of the UNFCCC.
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COP Year Place Achievement
COP 10 2004 Buenos
Aries,
Argentina
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action
was adopted to promote develop-
ing countries better adapt to cli-
mate change.
COP 11/
CMP 1
2005 Montreal,
Canada
The Ad-Hoc Working Group on
Annex I Parties’ further commit-
ments under the Kyoto Protocol
was established.
COP 12/
CMP 2
2006 Nairobi,
Kenya
Decisions were adopted at COP
12 designed to mitigate climate
change and help countries adapt to
the effects.
COP 13/
CMP 3
2007 Bali,
Indonesia
The Bali Action Plan, roadmap on
long-term issues of climate change,
was adopted and the Ad-Hoc
Working Group on Long-term Co-
operative Action under the Con-
vention was established.
COP 14/
CMP 4
2008 Pozna,
Poland
It launched the Adaptation Fund
under the Kyoto Protocol to help
the poorest nations cope with the
effects of climate change.
COP 15/
CMP 5
2009 Copenhagen,
Denmark
The Copenhagen Accord, which
included agreement on the long-
term goal of limiting the global
temperature increase, was noted
by the Parties.
COP 16/
CMP 6
2010 Cancn,
Mexico
Parties recognized the IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report goal of
a maximum 2 ◦C global warming
and all Parties should take urgent
action to meet this goal. The
Cancn Agreement on creating
Green Climate Fund and new
institutions and processes was
adopted.
COP 17/
CMP 7
2011 Durban,
South
Africa
The Ad-Hoc working Group on
the Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action was decided on achieving
a universal climate agreement no
later than 2015.
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COP Year Place Achievement
COP 18/
CMP 8
2012 Doha,
Qatar
The COP 18 resulted in a pack-
age of decisions, referred to as the
“Doha Climate Gateway”, which
included amendments to the Ky-
oto Protocol to establish its second
commitment period (2013-2020)
COP 19/
CMP 9
2013 Warsaw,
Poland
The meeting adopted an ADP
decision that it invites Parties
to initiate or intensify domestic
preparations for their intended na-
tionally determined contributions
(INDCs).
COP 20/
CMP 10
2014 Lima,
Peru
Groundwork for COP 21 by cap-
turing progress was made.
COP 21/
CMP 11
2015 Paris,
France
The Paris Agreement was adopted
and muss wait for signature and
ratification to enter into force.
COP 22/
CMP 12
2016 Marrakech,
Morocco
More details on implementation
of the Paris Agreement were dis-
cussed.
Table 2.1: History of COP and its main achievements
2.2 Kyoto Protocol
2.2.1 Essential background
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is
the first international agreement on global climate change issues. However, this
framework sets no binding targets on greenhouse gas emissions for its partici-
pants. The first international agreement with a binding target on the reduction
of GHG emissions is the Kyoto Protocol (UN 98). In 1996, the IPCC pub-
lished its Second Assessment Report (SAR) with additional special materials
on the implications of various potential emission limitations and regional conse-
quences, which provided key input to the negotiations that led to the adoption
of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. On 11 December 1997, after intensive
negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan. On
16 February 2005, the Protocol entered into force. So far, there are 192 Parties
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to the Protocol, except for Canada.
Having the same objective as the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol aimed to
stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,
just as specified in the Article 2 of UNFCCC. The principle of the protocol is
based on common but differentiated responsibilities. That means, it puts the
obligation to reduce current emissions on developed countries on the basis that
they are historically responsible for the current levels of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere. The developing countries are not required to do so, and are only
encouraged to reduce their emissions on a voluntary basis.
2.2.2 Participants
The UNFCCC divides countries into three main groups according to differing
commitments. These are Annex I countries, Annex II countries and Non-Annex
I countries.
Annex I countries consist of the industrialized countries that are members
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in
1992, plus countries with economies in transition (EIT), including the Russian
Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States.
Annex II countries include the OECD members of Annex I, but not
the EIT Parties. These countries usually have to provide financial resources
for developing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the
Convention and to help them adapt to adverse effects of climate change.
Non-Annex I countries are mostly developing countries. Most of these
countries belonged in the low-income group, with very few classified as middle-
income. Others are the emerging economics, the wealthy Gulf and South Korea.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, only the Annex I Parties committed themselves
to national or joint reduction targets. Formally this was called “quantified emis-
sion limitation and reduction objectives”. Non-Annex countries did not have
17
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binding targets. These countries did not commit themselves to any emission
reduction target but still had to ratify the agreement so that the Kyoto Proto-
col could be agreed between the Annex I and Annex II Parties in order to allow
the Annex I Parties to achieve their commitments partially by applying CDM
projects, which will be introduced later. Table 2.2 shows the Annex I countries.
Annex I countries to UNFCCC (EIT countries are with ?)
Australia European Union Liechtenstein Russian Federation ?
Austria Finland Lithuania ? Slovakia
Belarus ? France Luxembourg Slovenia ?
Belgium Germany Malta Spain
Bulgaria ? Greece Monaco Sweden
Canada Hungary Netherlands Switzerland
Croatia ? Iceland New Zealand Turkey
Cyprus Ireland Norway Ukraine ?
Czech Republic Italy Poland UK
Denmark Japan Portugal USA
Estonia ? Latvia ? Romania ?
Table 2.2: Annex I countries to Kyoto Protocol - Source: UNFCCC
All non-Annex I countries can be seen in Table 2.3.
Non-Annex I countries to UNFCCC
Afghanistan Djibouti Malawi Sao Tome and
Principe
Albania Dominica Malaysia Saudi Arabia
Algeria Dominican
Republic
Maldives Senegal
Andorra Ecuador Mali Serbia
Angola Egypt Marshall Islands Seychelles
Antigua and
Barbuda
El Salvador Mauritania Sierra Leone
Argentina Equatorial
Guinea
Mauritius Singapore
Armenia Eritrea Mexico Solomon Islands
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Micronesia Somalia
Bahamas Fiji Mongolia South Africa
Bahrain Gabon Montenegro South Sudan
Bangladesh Gambia Morocco Sri Lanka
Barbados Georgia Mozambique Sudan
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Non-Annex I countries to UNFCCC
Belize Ghana Myanmar Suriname
Benin Grenada Namibia Swaziland
Bhutan Guatemala Nauru Syrian Arab
Republic
Bolivia Guinea Nepal Tajikistan
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Thailand
Botswana Guyana Niger The former
Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia
Brazil Haiti Nigeria Timor-Leste
Brunei
Darussalam
Honduras Niue Togo
Burkina Faso India Oman Tonga
Burundi Indonesia Pakistan Trinidad and
Tobago
Cambodia Iran Palau Tunisia
Cabo Verde Iraq Palestine Turkmenistan
Cameroon Israel Panama Tuvalu
Central African Republic
Jamaica
Papua New
Guinea
Uganda
Chad Jordan Paraguay United Arab
Emirates
Chile Kazakhstan Peru United Republic
of Tanzania
China Kenya Philippines Uruguay
Colombia Kiribati Qatar Uzbekistan
Comoros Kuwait Republic of
Korea
Vanuatu
Congo Kyrgyzstan Republic of
Moldova
Venezuela
Cook Islands Lao People’s
Democratic
Republic
Rwanda Viet Nam
Costa Rica Lebanon Saint Kitts and
Nevis
Yemen
Cuba Lesotho Saint Lucia Zambia
Coˆte d’Ivoire Liberia Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
Zimbabwe
Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of
Korea
Libya Samoa
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Non-Annex I countries to UNFCCC
Democratic Re-
public of the
Congo
Madagascar San Marino
Table 2.3: Non-Annex I countries to Kyoto Protocol - Source: UNFCCC
2.2.3 Target of Kyoto Protocol
Objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions in the
atmosphere. Greenhouse gases are defined by UNFCCC as gaseous constituents
of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radi-
ation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of infrared radiation emitted
by the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere, and clouds. This property causes the
greenhouse effect. The targets of the Kyoto Protocol covered emissions of the
six main greenhouse gases, namely:
• Carbon dioxide (CO2);
• Methane (CH4);
• Nitrous oxide (N2O);
• Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs);
• Perfluorocarbons (PFCs); and
• Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Among these, carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), and methane
(CH4) are the primary greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere. Sulphur
hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorocarbons (PFCs)
are other greenhouse gases which have far greater global warming potential but
are much less prevalent. All of the six GHG are translated into CO2 equi-
valents in determining reductions in emissions. CO2-equivalent emission is a
common scale for comparing emissions of different GHGs, they are weighted
by Global Warming Potentials (GWP) with a 100-year time horizon. Table
2.4 below shows the lifetimes and direct 100-year GWP relative to CO2 for
ozone-depleting substances and their replacements. These values are from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Second Assessment Re-
port (SAR) (IPCC 95) and Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (IPCC 07), re-
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spectively.
Greenhouse Gases Formula 100yr GWP (SAR) 100yr GWP (AR4)
Carbon dioxide CO2 1 1
Methane CH4 21 25
Nitrous oxide N2O 310 298
Hydrofluorocarbons HFCs 140-11700 124-14800
Perfluorocarbons PFCs 6500-9200 7390-13300
Sulphur hexafluoride SF6 23900 22800
Table 2.4: Greenhouse gas emissions and their Global Warming Poten-
tials - Data source: IPCC, SAR, AR4.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, all Annex I Parties are obligated to reduce their
collective annual GHG emissions by 5.2% in average, compared to the baseline
1990 from 2008 to 2012. This period is defined as the first commitment pe-
riod. For each Party, the assigned amount is known as the maximum amount
of emissions, measured as the equivalent in carbon dioxide, that a Party may
emit over a commitment period in order to comply with its emissions target.
The individual targets for Annex I Parties are listed in the following Table 2.5.
Parties Targets with baseline 1990
EU-15, Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Monaco, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Switzerland
-8%
US -7%
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland -6%
Croatia -5%
New Zealand, Russian Federation,
Ukraine
0
Norway 1%
Australia 8%
Iceland 10%
Table 2.5: Individual targets for Annex I Parties to KP, 2008-2012 -
Data source: Kyoto Protocol.
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Baseline 1990 is defined as the base year for the national GHG inventory and
the calculation of the assigned amount for most Parties. However, five Parties:
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, have an alternative base
year (UNFCCC 08). The base year for each of these Parties is as follows:
• Bulgaria: 1988;
• Hungary: the average of the years from 1985 to 1987;
• Poland: 1988;
• Romania: 1989; and
• Slovenia: 1986.
For these Parties, their assigned amounts should be calculated using the
Annex A emissions in their specified base year or period, rather than 1990. An
Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) is a tradable ‘Kyoto unit’ or ‘carbon credit’ rep-
resenting an allowance to emit greenhouse gases comprising one metric tonne
of carbon dioxide equivalents calculated using their Global Warming Potential
(GWP). Assigned Amount Units are issued up to the level of initial “assigned
amount” of an Annex I countries to the Kyoto Protocol. In this sense, the
“assigned amounts” are the Kyoto Protocol Annex B emission targets, or say
“quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives”, expressed as levels
of allowed emissions over the 2008-2012 commitment period. Table 2.6 below
shows the initial assigned amount of Annex I countries published by the UN-
FCCC secretariat in 2008. Note that Belarus, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are
listed in the Convention’s Annex I, but they do not have emission reduction
targets in the Kyoto Protocol as they were not Annex I Parties when the Pro-
tocol was adopted.
The EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
UK. The 15 States who were EU members in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol
was adopted, took an overall target at -8% that must be redistributed among
themselves. These countries have different individual targets, but which com-
bined make an overall target for that group of countries. The EU reached an
agreement on how its targets will be redistributed, which is called the Burden
Sharing Agreement. The Burden Sharing Agreement entered into force in 1998,
one year after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The individual reduction
22
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Parties Initial assigned
amount
Parties Initial assigned
amount
Australia - Liechtenstein 1,055,623
Austria 3,443,866,009 Lithuania 227,306,177
Belgium 673,995,528 Luxembourg 47,402,996
Bulgaria 610,045,827 Monaco 495,221
Canada 2,791,792,771 Netherlands 1,001,262,141
Croatia - New Zealand 309,564,733
Czech
Republic
893,541,801 Norway 250,576,797
Denmark 276,838,955 Poland 2,648,181,038
Estonia 196,062,637 Portugal 381,937,527
European
Community
19,621,381,509 Romania 1,279,835,099
Finland 355,017,545 Russian
Federation
16,617,095,319
France 2,819,626,640 Slovakia 331,433,516
Germany 4,868,096,694 Slovenia 93,628,593
Greece 668,669,806 Spain 1,666,195,929
Hungary 542,366,600 Sweden 375,188,561
Iceland 18,523,847 Switzerland 242,838,402
Ireland 314,184,272 Ukraine 4,604,184,663
Italy 2,416,277,898 UK 3,412,080,630
Japan 5,928,257,666 US -
Latvia 119,182,130
Table 2.6: Initial assigned amount of Annex I Parties to Kyoto Protocol
- Data source: UNFCCC secretariat. Data of US, Australia and Croatia are not
published.
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target for each EU-15 country over the first commitment period (2008-2012) is
listed in Table 2.7.
EU-15 Parties Individual target
Austria -13%
Belgium -7.50%
Denmark -21%
Finland 0%
France 0%
Germany -21%
Greece 25%
Ireland 13%
Italy -6.50%
Luxembourg -28%
Netherlands -6%
Portugal 27%
Spain 15%
Sweden 4%
UK -12.50%
Table 2.7: Individual reduction targets of EU to Kyoto Protocol, 2008-
2012 - Data source: EEA.
Figure 2.1 shows the Burden Sharing target for each of the EU-15 countries
and its corresponding annual reduction volume of GHG emissions.
Instead of reducing the GHG emissions, human activities such as afforesta-
tion and reforestation are also considered as an effective way to stabilize the
climate change. Forests present a significant global carbon stock accumulated
through growth of trees and an increase in soil carbon. Under the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change any process, activity or mech-
anism which removes a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere is referred to as a
“sink” (UN 92). Human activities impact terrestrial sinks, through land use,
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities. LULUCF activities help
to increase the removals of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere or decrease
emissions by sources leading to an accumulation of carbon stocks. Therefore,
Annex I countries are allowed to use a limited amount of permits resulting from
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Figure 2.1: Burden Sharing targets for EU-15 countries to Kyoto Pro-
tocol
the LULUCF activities for their compliance.
2.2.4 Mechanism
Annex B countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions must meet their targets primarily through
national measures. However, to achieve the emission reduction target more
efficiently, the Kyoto Protocol defines different market-based mechanisms for
the Annex B countries to meet their individual emission limitation commitments
as additional means. These Kyoto mechanisms are:
1. Emission Trading (ET)
2. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
3. Joint Implementation (JI)
Emission trading (ET) mechanism is a flexibility measure allows Annex
B countries to trade their emission permits among themselves. The allowed
emissions during the first commitment period of Kyoto are divided into as-
signed amount units (AAUs). Countries have sufficient emission units can sell
this excess capacity to countries that are over their targets. Since the overall
assigned amount units are limited for these countries and trading is allowed
among them, the emission permits can be seen as a new commodity. Beside
AAUs, other units can be traded or sold under the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions
25
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trading scheme as well. These are: The Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
generated from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); The Emission Re-
duction Units (ERUs) generated by the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JI);
And the Removal Units (RMUs) based on the land use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCF) activities. Table 2.8 summarizes the status of international
emission trading systems of the Annex I countries to the Kyoto Protocol.
Both Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)
are project-based mechanisms. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) al-
lows a country to implement an emission-reduction project in developing coun-
tries. Once a project has been implemented successfully, a certain number of
saleable Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one
tonne of CO2, can be used by this Annex B country to meet its Kyoto target.
Being operational since 2006, this mechanism has already registered more than
1,650 projects and is anticipated to produce 2.9 billion CERs in the first com-
mitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, most of them are created by the projects
in China.
Similar to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the Joint Implemen-
tation (JI) mechanism is also project-based but allows an Annex B country
to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emis-
sion removal project in another Annex B country. The created units can be
counted towards meeting its own Kyoto target. This means a project between
two developed countries. The purpose of a JI project is to provide developed
countries a flexible and cost-efficient way for fulfilling a part of their Kyoto
commitments, while the host country can benefit from foreign investment and
technology transfer.
2.2.5 Compliance
AAUs, CERs, ERUs and RMUs are tradable units under the Kyoto Protocol’s
emissions trading scheme. Their transfers and acquisitions have to be tracked
and recorded through the registry systems under the Kyoto Protocol. Two
types of registry are being implemented. First, national registries have been
implemented by the governments of all 38 Annex B countries under the Kyoto
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Country System Start in Scope Reduction tar-
get
Sector
Australia GGAS 2003 New South
Wales
7.27 tonnes of car-
bon dioxide per
capita by the year
2007
Electricity retailer
and certain other
Parties including
large electricity
users
Canada Alberta’s
ETS
2007 Alberta 50 million tCO2 e
reduction by 2020
Industry, forestry,
energy and waste
European
Union
EU ETS 2005 EU, Norway,
Iceland, and
Liechten-
stein
21% by 2020 com-
pared to 2005
Power and heat
generation, indus-
try, aviation
Japan Tokyo ETS 2010 Tokyo 25% by 2020 com-
pared to 2000 le-
vels
Large-scale fa-
cilities (build-
ings/factories)
for industrial and
commercial sector
purpose
New
Zealand
NZ ETS 2008 nation-wide 0% below 1990
levels during the
first Kyoto period
Forestry, energy,
industry and waste
Norway Norwegian
ETS
2005 nation-wide less than 1%
increase compared
to 1990 levels
during 2008-2012
Power and heat
generation, indus-
try
Switzerland Swiss ETS 2008 nation-wide 20% by 2020 com-
pared to 1990 le-
vels
Cement, chemicals,
refineries, paper,
heat and steel
UK UK ETS 2002 nation-wide 20% by 2010 com-
pared to 1990 le-
vels
Industries and
organisations who
promised to make
reductions
US RGGI 2009 10 north-
eastern U.S.
states
more than 45% by
2020 relative to
2005 levels
Fossil fuel Power
Plants
Table 2.8: International Emission Trading Systems of Annex I Countries
before 1. Kyoto Period
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Protocol. These national registries contain accounts within which units are held
in the name of the government or in the name of legal entities authorized by
the government to hold and trade units. Second, the UNFCCC secretariat has
implemented the CDM registry for issuing CDM credits and distributing them
to national registries.
An international transaction log (ITL) ensures secure transfer of emission
reduction units between countries. The international transaction log (ITL) is
administrated by the UNFCCC secretariat, it verifies registry transactions in
real time, to ensure they are consistent with rules agreed under the Kyoto
Protocol. One of important function of the ITL is to support the review and
compliance process of the Kyoto Protocol.
When trading the emission units, in order to make sure that all Annex B
countries will not oversell their units and subsequently are not able to meet
their own emissions targets, each country is obligated to maintain a reserve of
AAUs, CERs, ERUs and EMUs in its national registries. This reserve is re-
quired not to drop below 90% of the country’s assigned amount or 100% of five
times its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lowest. This reserve is
known as the Commitment Period Reserve (CPR).
According to Kyoto Protocol, all Annex I Parties are obligated to reduce
their collective annual GHG emissions by 5.2% in average, compared to the
baseline 1990 from 2008 to 2012. For a few countries, the base year is other
than 1990. For each country, their individual reduction targets differ. The base
year level of total national emissions will be calculated for each Annex B Party.
This together with the corresponding individual reduction target determines
the total assigned amount that will be distributed to the Parties for their use
during the first Kyoto commitment period.
We take Austria as an example. Austria has the base year of 1990. It faces a
reduction target of 13% under the Kyoto Protocol. The country has emitted in
this year totally 79,049,657 tonnes CO2 equivalent. Therefore, the total number
of initial assigned amount for this country during the first commitment period
28
2.2 Kyoto Protocol
from 2008 to 2012 (5 years in total) is calculated by:
79, 049, 657 tCO2× 5× (100%− 13%) = 343, 866, 009 tCO2.
This means Austria faces a cap of 68,773,202 tonnes CO2 equivalent annu-
ally in average from 2008 to 2012. Table 2.10 summarizes the emission reduction
targets of all 38 Annex B countries under the Kyoto Protocol, their base year
level of total national emissions in tCO2 and their initial assigned amounts in
tCO2.
Annex B Party Target Base year Base year level IAA in tCO2
Australia 8% 1990 547,699,841 2,957,579,141
Austria -13% 1990 79,049,657 343,866,009
Belarus - - - -
Belgium -7.5% 1990 145,728,763 673,995,528
Bulgaria -8% 1988 132,618,658 610,045,827
Canada -6% 1990 593,998,462 2,791,792,771
Croatia -5% 1990 31,321,790 148,778,503
Czech Republic -8% 1990 194,248,218 893,541,801
Denmark -21% 1990 69,978,070 276,838,955
Estonia -8% 1990 42,622,312 196,062,637
European Union -8% 1990 4,265,517,719 19,621,381,509
Finland 0% 1990 71,003,509 355,017,545
France 0% 1990 563,925,328 2,819,626,640
Germany -21% 1990 1,232,429,543 4,868,096,694
Greece 25% 1990 106,987,169 668,669,806
Hungary -6% 1985-87 115,397,149 542,366,600
Iceland 10% 1990 3,367,972 18,523,847
Ireland 13% 1990 55,607,836 314,184,272
Italy -6.5% 1990 516,850,887 2,416,277,898
Japan -6% 1990 1,261,331,418 5,928,257,666
Latvia -8% 1990 25,909,159 119,182,130
Liechtenstein -8% 1990 229,483 1,055,623
Lithuania -8% 1990 49,414,386 227,306,177
Luxembourg -28% 1990 13,167,499 47,402,996
Monaco -8% 1990 107,658 495,221
Netherlands -6% 1990 213,034,498 1,001,262,141
New Zealand 0% 1990 61,912,947 309,564,733
Norway 1% 1990 49,619,168 250,576,797
Poland -6% 1988 563,442,774 2,648,181,038
Portugal 27% 1990 60,147,642 381,937,527
Romania -8% 1989 278,225,022 1,279,835,099
Russian Federation 0% 1990 3,323,419,064 16,617,095,319
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Country System Start in Scope Reduction target
Slovakia -8% 1990 72,050,764 331,433,516
Slovenia -8% 1986 20,354,042 93,628,593
Spain 15% 1990 289,773,205 1,666,195,929
Sweden 4% 1990 72,151,646 375,188,561
Switzerland -8% 1990 52,790,957 242,838,402
Ukraine 0% 1990 920,836,933 4,604,184,663
UK -12.5% 1990 779,904,144 3,412,080,630
Table 2.9: Annex B countries, their reduction targets, base year emis-
sions and the corresponding Initial Assigned Amount of Kyoto Protocol
Since trading is allowed and different kinds of permit units can be trans-
ferred among Annex B Parties, these countries shall not only focus on their
use of AAUs, but also on the other tradable units in their national registries
for compliance. Therefore, in order to compliance, the total number of permit
units in the national registry of one country is calculated as:
Total number of permits in the national registry = Initial Assigned Amount
+AAUs + CERs + ERUs + RMUs.
Note that the amount of AAUs, ERUs and RMUs can be also negative,
which means more units of such permits are sold than bought by this country.
The number of CERs can only be positive, since they can be only bought by an
Annex B country from a CDM project established in a developing (Non-Annex
I) country.
In implementation of Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period,
Annex B Parties face two situations at the end: compliance and non-compliance.
Compliance means a Party has sufficient number of permit units in its na-
tional registry to cover its total emissions between 2008 and 2012. Or say, the
number of permits in the national registry must be no less than the number
of tonnes emissions between 2008 to 2012. However, there is a special case
with compliance: A Party can “over-achieve” its reduction target in the first
commitment period by holding more permits in its national registry than its
real emissions. Then this Party is allowed to bank its unused units for use in
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the subsequent period, if there is one. However, not all kinds of permits can be
banked in total to the subsequent period. There are restrictions on the volume
of RMUs, CERs and ERUs. RMUs cannot be banked for use in subsequent pe-
riods, but their volume is sufficiently small that they can readily be used in the
first period for compliance. Similar remarks apply to ERUs and CERs, of which
a maximum of 2.5% of Initial Assigned Amounts each can be banked. (Grub 03)
In case of non-compliance, a Party does not have sufficient permits to cover
its real emissions, then it faces a penalty. This Party is then required to make
up the difference between its real emissions and its assigned amount during
the subsequent commitment period, plus an additional deduction of 30%. For
example, if Country A fails to fulfill the compliance condition and has a lack of
100 million permits in the first commitment period, then it will receive 100 mil-
lion permits less in the second commitment period than as planned. Moreover,
it has to hand in 30 million additional permits during the second period. Recall
that this penalty mechanism will be only functional if the second commitment
period exits.
The Compliance Committee under the Kyoto Protocol is responsible for the
compliance mechanism of Annex B Parties and is made up of two branches: the
facilitative branch and the enforcement branch. The facilitative branch provides
advice and assistance to Parties in order to promote compliance, whereas the
enforcement branch has the responsibility to determine if an Annex B Party is
not in compliance with its emissions targets. In the case of compliance with
emission targets, if a Party’s actual emissions exceed its assigned amount of
Kyoto units for that commitment period, the Compliance Committee will give
this Party 100 days to make up any shortfall in compliance by acquiring AAUs,
CERs, ERUs or RMUs through emissions trading. If, at the end of this period,
this Party’s emissions are still greater than its assigned amount, the enforce-
ment branch will declare the Party to be in non-compliance and apply.
2.2.6 Ratification of Kyoto Protocol
On 11 December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted by COP 3 and was
opened for signature on 16 March 1998 during one year by Parties to UNFCCC.
31
2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Before the expiration of the signature period, 82 countries and the European
Community signed the Protocol. For the Protocol to enter into force, it has to
be ratified by the Parties. Singing indicates an intention to ratify the Protocol.
Ratification means that a Party is legally bound by the provisions of the treaty.
For Annex I Parties this means that it agrees to cap emissions in accordance
with the Kyoto Protocol.
Article 25 of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol enters into force “on
the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Con-
vention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total
for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Annex I
countries, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession.” (UN 98) The ratification process started on 17 September 1998.
Once the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, it has the same legal effect to all
Annex B countries.
Iceland was the 55th state to ratify the Protocol, that fulfilled the first con-
dition for coming-into-force. With Russia’s ratification on 18 November 2004,
the “55 percent of 1990 carbon dioxide emissions of the Parties included in
Annex I” clause was satisfied and the treaty was brought into force, effective
16 February 2005, after the required lapse of 90 days. So far, there are 192
Parties, including 191 States and 1 regional economic integration organization,
to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.
The USA, accounting for 36% of total global emissions in 1990, signed the
Protocol on 12 November 1998, but did not submitted to the Senate for ratifi-
cation during the Clinton presidency. The treaty has to become binding in the
USA only if it has to be ratified by the Senate. However, a passed no-binding
resolution by the Senate in July 1997, the Byrd Hagel Resolution, expressed
that the US would not approve any international agreement that did not require
developing countries to make emission reductions and would seriously harm the
economy of the United States. Even in the presidency of George W. Bush, his
administration’s position was opposed the Kyoto treaty. As of 2016, the USA
is the only signatory that has not ratified the Protocol.
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In 2011, the Canadian government announced that Canada was legally with-
drawing from the Protocol. According to the Protocol, Canada was committed
to cutting its GHG emissions to 6% below 1990 levels by 2012. However, the
country’s total emissions in 2009 were 17% higher than its 1990’s level. There-
fore, Canada chose to withdraw because it calculated that it would have to
pay approximately 14 billion Canadian dollars in buying emission permits from
other Kyoto protocol countries to meet its commitment target. However, the
country could have also chosen to not meet its target and be declared non-
compliant. Then, under the enforcement procedure, its corresponding carbon
deficit, plus an additional penalty deduction of 30% from its assigned amount,
would have been carried over to the second commitment period. Therefore, in
order to avoid enormous financial penalties, the Canadian government chose
to withdrawal from the Protocol. Currently, Canada is the only country that
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol after the ratification.
2.2.7 Doha Amendment and second commitment period
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol started in 2008 and ended
on 31 December 2012. To ensure there is no gap between commitment periods,
the Kyoto Protocol Parties agreed at Durban Conference in 2011 that a second
commitment period shall begin on 1 January 2013. And this agreement was
adopted in the Doha Conference in 2012, known as the Doha Amendment to
the Kyoto Protocol. (UN 11)
The Doha Amendment set an eight-year-long commitment period, running
from 1 January 2013 until 31 December 2020. Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
of the second commitment period are required to reduce their aggregate emis-
sions by 18% below the 1990 levels in average. The reduction commitment of
each individual Parties range from 24% to 0.5%. The European Union, as a
whole Party, is required to reduce its emissions by 20%. Table 2.10 shows the
reduction commitments of the Parties to the second period, compared to their
reduction commitments to the first Kyoto period.
There are totally 37 countries with binding targets: The European Union
with its 28 member states, Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liechten-
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Annex B Party KP target Doha target
Australia 8.0% -0.5%
Austria -13.0% -20.0%
Belarus - -12.0%
Belgium -7.5% -20.0%
Bulgaria -8.0% -20.0%
Croatia -5.0% -20.0%
Cyprus - -20.0%
Czech Republic -8.0% -20.0%
Denmark -21.0% -20.0%
Estonia -8.0% -20.0%
European Union -8.0% -20.0%
Finland 0.0% -20.0%
France 0.0% -20.0%
Germany -21.0% -20.0%
Greece 25.0% -20.0%
Hungary -6.0% -20.0%
Iceland 10.0% -20.0%
Ireland 13.0% -20.0%
Italy -6.5% -20.0%
Kazakhstan - -5.0%
Latvia -8.0% -20.0%
Liechtenstein -8.0% -16.0%
Lithuania -8.0% -20.0%
Luxembourg -28.0% -20.0%
Malta - -20.0%
Monaco -8.0% -22.0%
Netherlands -6.0% -20.0%
Norway 1.0% -16.0%
Poland -6.0% -20.0%
Portugal 27.0% -20.0%
Romania -8.0% -20.0%
Slovakia -8.0% -20.0%
Slovenia -8.0% -20.0%
Spain 15.0% -20.0%
Sweden 4.0% -20.0%
Switzerland -8.0% -15.8%
Ukraine 0.0% -24.0%
UK -12.5% -20.0%
Table 2.10: Reduction commitments of Kyoto Protocol and Doha
Amendment - Data source: Doha Amendment, UNFCCC.
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stein, Norway, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Belarus, Cyprus, Malta and Kaza-
khstan were not Annex B Parties of the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment
Period, but have their reduction commitments for the second period, as Belarus,
Cyprus and Malta are listed in the Convention’s Annex I list, but they do not
have emission reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol. Kazakhstan does not
have a target, but has declared that it wishes to become an Annex I Party
to the Convention in the first Kyoto period. However, after the adaptation of
the Doha Amendment, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine stated that they may
withdraw from the Protocol or not put into legal force the Amendment with
second round targets. Japan, New Zealand and Russia have binding targets
in the first Kyoto period but did not take any new targets in the second com-
mitment period. Other developed countries without reduction targets for the
second period are Canada and USA. Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol
in 2012 and USA did not ratify the Protocol.
According to the Kyoto Protocol, the Doha Amendment can only enter into
force, when at least 144 Annex I countries to the UNFCCC have ratified it.
However, as of November 2016, only 66 states have accepted the Doha amend-
ment. This means the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is still
not binding under international law. Thereafter, all Annex B Parties would not
be legally bound by their reduction commitments in respect of the period after
31 December 2012.
An absent of the entry into force of the Doha Amendment may cause prob-
lems for ensuring the Kyoto Protocol’s operational continuity. For instance,
the Kyoto Protocol requires that Annex B Parties have to review their re-
duction commitments by the end of 2014 with a view to increasing the level of
their mitigation ambition. However, without a binding target, any commitment
would not be forced and therefore cannot ensure the compliance. The market
mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol also requires a continuity of the commitment
periods to ensure compliance mechanism. In the first Kyoto Period, Annex B
Parties may carry over their surplus permit units into the subsequent trading
period. Meanwhile, Parties do not have sufficient permits to cover their total
emissions will face a penalty and have to make up the difference between their
real emissions and their assigned amount during the subsequent commitment
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period, plus an additional deduction of 30%. If the second commitment period
is not legally binding, then the compliance mechanism would not be functional.
2.3 COP 21 and Paris Agreement
On 12 December 2015, the Paris Agreement was adopted at the 21st Confer-
ence of the Parties (COP 21) of the UNFCCC in Paris by 195 countries. The
Paris Agreement is an international agreement within the UNFCCC dealing
with greenhouse gases emissions and climate change issues. After the adapta-
tion, it was opened for signature on 22 April 2016 and then entered into force
on 4 November 2016, after sufficient states ratified the agreement and therefore
the conditions for entering into force were satisfied.
2.3.1 Aims and NDCs
The Kyoto Protocol aims to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfe-
rence with the climate system. For this purpose, it puts the obligation to
reduce emissions on developed countries, but without setting any target on
the developing countries. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement sets
emission reduction target for all countries and regional economic integration
organization. In this sense, it is also seen as the world’s first comprehensive
climate agreement. The aim of this deal is stated in Article 2 of the Paris
Agreement (UN 15a):
• Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2◦C
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5◦C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
• Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change
and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions develop-
ment, in a manner that does not threaten food production;
• Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse
gas emissions and climate-resilient development.
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The primary task of Paris Agreement is to hold the increase in global average
temperature to well below 2◦C, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5◦C, as well as to achieve net zero emissions in the second half
of this century. To achieve this long-term goal, the Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs), described in Article 3 of the Agreement, are used as a
bottom-up approach since the fully implementation of Paris Agreement. Gen-
erally, NDCs are the commitments of each country under UNFCCC on how
they will cut emissions for the post-2020 period.
Before Cop 21 in December 2015, developed and developing countries sub-
mitted their national post-2020 climate action commitments to UNFCCC, known
as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). The INDC of a
country specifies the target of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of this
country. The word ‘intended’ was used because countries were communicating
proposed climate actions before COP 21, in which the Paris Agreement was
adopted. All INDCs submitted were included in a synthesis report by the UN-
FCCC secretariat in October 2015 and this report was updated in May 2016
(UN 15b) (UN 16). The report reflects the aggregate emissions impact of IN-
DCs. After the adaptation of Paris Agreement, the INDC of a country became
the first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) when it ratified the agree-
ment, unless the country decided to submit a new NDC at the same time. After
the Paris Agreement was ratified, the NDCs became the first greenhouse gas
targets under the UNFCCC to all developed and developing countries. The sta-
tus of NDCs are recorded in the NDC registry under UNFCCC and is regulated
by the UNFCCC secretariat.
However, the current commitments on NDCs are not consistent with limit-
ing global warming to well below 2◦C, as stated in the Paris Agreement. This
means the current NDCs are not the final targets to the deal. Therefore, the
NDCs are designed to be assessed and improved regularly, so that they are
able to achieve the global temperature reduction aim. This mechanism will be
explained in the subsequent subsection.
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2.3.2 Main features of Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement covers the traditional thematic areas of the UNFCCC
such as mitigation, adaptation, financing and other climate relative issues. The
decisions on these key issues will be specified in this subsection.
Mitigation
Generally, mitigation means mitigating climate change by reducing GHG emis-
sions from human activities. It corresponds with the ultimate objective of the
UNFCCC, namely to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate sys-
tem. Mitigating climate change consists of actions to limit the magnitude or
rate of long-term climate change, and can also be achieved by increasing the
capacity of carbon sinks, e.g., through reforestation, as stated by the IPCC’s
Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 07).
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement does not set any concrete
emission reduction target to the Parties of UNFCCC. Instead, it sets objec-
tive of holding temperature well below 2◦C while also pursuing efforts to stay
below 1.5◦C (Article 2(1)). The temperature target is then translated into
emission reduction targets: to decline the global emissions as soon as possi-
ble and to realize a balance of net zero GHG emissions in the second half of
the century (Article 4(1)). For this purpose, the NDC mechanism is imple-
mented and has to be improved regularly (Article 4(2)). Moreover, the NDCs
submitted by Parties will be recorded in a public registry by the secretariat
of UNFCCC and not in the Agreement itself (Article 4(12)). As of November
2016, 111 Parties have submitted their first NDCs saved in the registry under
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx.
However, Parties to UNFCCC are not obligated to fulfill their NDCS’ plans.
Developed countries should undertake the economy-wide absolute emission re-
duction targets. And developing countries are encouraged to move towards
such targets (Article 4(4)). Also, the NDCs submitted by Parties are not on
the same timeframe. Some of the current NDCs start in 2020, others in 2021.
Most of them indicate an implementation timeline up to 2030, and some of
them up to 2025. Some NDCs have multiyear targets, some have single year
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targets. Therefore, Parties are also encouraged to develop and communicate
long-term low greenhouse gas emission strategies. The Agreement specifies
that these NDCs should point towards 2050 as mid-century targets and in-
vites all Parties to communicate their strategies by 2020 (Article 4(19)). As
of November 2016, USA, Mexico, Germany and Canada submitted their long-
term strategy to the secretariat of UNFCCC. Their long-term goals can be found
here:http://unfccc.int/focus/long-term_strategies/items/9971.php.
Recognizing the current NDCs are not sufficient to achieve the temperature
target on well below 2◦C, the Paris Agreement also specifies the assessment
and improvement of the NDCs. Parties to UNFCCC are required to regularly
submit their national emissions inventories and report on their progress. Every
five years, collective progress towards achieving the long-term goals of the Paris
Agreement has to be assessed, and countries must submit their new NDCs re-
presenting greater action than their previous plans (Article 4(2)). Furthermore,
each new NDC should be more ambitious than the previous one, known as the
principle of progression (Article 4(3)). Also, an upward adjustment of NDCs is
possible at any time (Article 4(11)).
Also in every five years, a global stocktake has to be made to assess the
collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and the
long-term temperature goal (Article 14(1)). Each new NDC shall be informed
by the outcome of the preceding stocktake. Therefore, the global stocktakes are
scheduled to give Parties time to include the results in the preparation of their
next NDC. The first stocktake will take place in 2023 (Article 14(2, 3)). And a
facilitative dialogue will take stock of efforts in 2018 first. The assessment and
improvement mechanism of NDCs together with the global stocktakes ensure
that the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement can be achieved. Figure 2.2
illustrates how this NDC mechanism works.
Adaptation
Another major area of action under the UNFCCC is adapting to the adverse ef-
fects of climate change. adaptation refers to the actions that countries will need
to take to respond to the impacts of climate change that are already happen-
ing, while at the same time preparing for future impacts. Unlike the mitigation,
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Figure 2.2: NDC and global stocktaking mechanism
provisions regarding adaptation for individual Party are less precise than those
on mitigation.
The Paris Agreement sets a global goal to significantly strengthen national
adaptation efforts, namely to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience
and reduce vulnerability to climate change (Article 7(1)). For this purpose, all
Parties should submit and update periodically an adaptation communication
on their priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions (Arti-
cle 7(10, 11)), and the submitted adaptation communications will be recorded
in a public registry (Article 7(12)). It is worth to mention that provisions on
adaptation are all qualitative and do not include any quantitative goal, this
might reflect the difficult of prescribing specific actions for individual countries
on an international level.
Climate finance
As the third key issue of the Paris Agreement, climate finance refers to local,
national or transnational financing that seeks to support mitigation and adap-
tation actions that will address the climate change problem.
In accordance with the Agreement, developed countries shall provide fi-
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nancial resources to assist developing countries with respect to both mitigation
and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the UNFCCC
(Article 9(1)). Other countries are encouraged to provide or continue to provide
such support voluntarily (Article 9(2)). Apart from providing financial support,
the Agreement also establishes that developed countries should continue to take
the lead in the global effort to mobilize climate finance from a wide variety of
sources (Article 9(3)).
Although there is no quantitative financing goal specified in the Paris Agree-
ment, the expression on this issue together with the long-term goal on mitiga-
tion and adaptation is a major innovation. The statement making finance flows
consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-
resilient development, send a strong signal to the private sector to reassess and
redirect its investments, for instance, in the low carbon technologies or in the
renewable energy.
2.3.3 Criticism and outlook
The Paris Agreement as an international deal on climate change entered into
force by November 2016. However, it still has to be translated into domestic
decisions in each country in order to realize emission reduction target in an ef-
fective way. The Agreement itself is seen as a binding international treaty, but
some key issues in the document do not have binding enforcement mechanism.
One of significant issues is the statement of Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (NDCs).
The current NDC level is seen not sufficient to achieve the well below 2◦C
target. Therefore, countries are required to review their domestic NDCs every
five years and they have to submit more ambitious plans. However, the state-
ment of the NDC mechanism in the Agreement is not legally binding. Further-
more, there is also no mechanism to force countries to the UNFCCC to set a
target in their NDC by a specific date and no enforcement if one countries fails
to meet its NDC target. This could lead to the problem that countries could
withdraw from the Agreement without bearing too much economic losses, since
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they will not be punished, just as what happened to Canada in the first com-
mitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, even for some binding
targets in the Agreement, there is no enforcement mechanism and no penalties
if countries failed to meet them.
The Paris Agreement does not mention the carbon market as well, although
it is considered as an important incentive for reducing the GHG emissions.
Instead, it establishes three different types of international cooperation on mi-
tigation and adaptation for increasing ambition (Article 6(1)). A cooperative
approach allows Parties to engage bilaterally or multilaterally by using interna-
tional transferred mitigation outcomes towards NDCs (Article 6(2)). A sustain-
able development mechanism involving both public and private entities, which
may in some aspects be similar to the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol (Article
6(4)). And a non-market approach is mentioned to sustainable development
(Article 6(8)). However, these approaches are less prescribed and might be
precisely defined in further negotiations.
Despite limitations in legal detail, lack of definition on carbon pricing, the
Paris Agreement sets a clear target on stabilizing the climate change issues by
mobilizing all Parties to UNFCCC, including developed and developing coun-
tries, and it gives a clear direction on how to enhance implementation to achieve
the target. In this sense, the Paris Agreement provides positive roles in the fol-
lowing aspects:
• It is a first comprehensive climate deal on a global scope and provides a
political momentum. Climate change is a consensus to all and needs to
be addressed through the participation of all nations. Developed coun-
tries can continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute
emission reduction targets. While developing countries can enhance their
efforts and move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction tar-
gets, under supports of developed countries.
• The Paris Agreement provides the mechanism for progressive preparation
and technical implementation of NDCs. Although the current level of
NDCs is not sufficient and needs to be improved in the future, a stock-
taking mechanism ensures that this agreement could be ratified and enter
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into force during a relative shorter period. And still the efforts on reduc-
tion targets could be made progressively.
• The Paris Agreement provides the guide line on how to address the global
warming problems and its procedural approach requires further details to
be confirmed. The forthcoming negotiations, including subsequent Con-
ferences of Parties (COPs), have to determine the remaining technical
details for the current provisions in the Paris Agreement. But it still
provides the flexibility for each country to define and implement its own
climate actions.
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3European Union Emission
Trading Scheme
3.1 Introduction
To fight against the global warming problems and to reduce the GHG emis-
sions, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), also known
as the European Union Emission Trading System, was launched Europe-wide
in 2005. As of 2016, the system covers 31 European countries and more than
11,000 installations in the energy and industrial sectors. These sectors are re-
sponsible for around 50% of EU GHG emissions. The EU ETS was the first
GHG emission trading system in the world and remains currently the world’s
largest.
3.1.1 Choosing the right mechanism
After the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC in 1997, the legally
binding GHG reduction targets were set on an international level, first for the
37 industrialized nations. In order to meet the Kyoto commitments, the Euro-
pean countries needed to set a policy instrument to control the emissions in the
European area. Therefore, the European Commission presented a green paper
on Greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union in 2000 with
its first ideas on the designs of the EU ETS. This led to the adoption of the
EU ETS Directive (EU 03) in 2003 and the introduction of the EU ETS in 2005.
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The European Emission Trading Scheme is designed as a cap-and-trade sys-
tem. The cap means the EU sets a total volume of greenhouse gases that can
be emitted by all participating installations. while trade means permits for
emissions are then auctioned off or allocated for free, and can subsequently be
traded within the system. Installations have to monitor and report their CO2
emissions, ensuring they have enough allowances to cover their emissions. If
an installation has performed well in reducing its emissions and has leftover
permits in its account, then it can sell them on the market. By contrast, if an
installation’s emissions exceed the level it is permitted by its allowances, it has
to purchase more allowances from others, otherwise it will face a penalty. Such
a system allows the participants to find the most cost-effective way for reducing
emissions without significant government intervention.
The EU chose the cap-and-trade system as the best way to achieve the tar-
get of reducing the GHG emissions at least cost for all participants and the
economy. Comparing with other policy instruments, the cap-and-trade struc-
ture has its own advantages. A command and control approach can regulate
the installations directly and mandate a standard to all participants, but has
little flexibility on controlling emission reduction for each company in a cost
efficient way. Meanwhile, a tax or a subsidy approach provides more flexibi-
lity, but does not guarantee that the GHG emissions reduction target can be
achieved, because companies can emit as much as they need. And it is difficult
to determine the right level of the taxes and the subsidies of all sectors artifi-
cially. However, in a cap-and-trade system, trading allows market participants
determine what the least-cost level is to meet the fixed cap. Therefore, the cap-
and-trade system provides the flexibility on reducing the emission targets and
guarantees that the targets will be achieved in a cost efficient way. According
to EU (EC 15a), such a system provides the following key benefits:
1. Certainty about quantity: GHG emissions trading directly limits GHG
emissions by setting a system cap that is designed to ensure compliance
with the relevant commitment. There is certainty about the maximum
quantity of GHG emissions for the period of time over which system caps
are set. This is relevant for supporting the EU’s international objectives
and obligations and achieving environmental goals.
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2. Cost-effectiveness: Trading reveals the carbon price to meet the desired
target. The flexibility that trading brings means that all firms face the
same carbon price and ensures that emissions are cut where it costs least
to do so.
3. Revenue: If GHG emissions allowances are auctioned, this creates a
source of revenue for governments, at least 50% of which should be used
to fund measures to tackle climate change in the EU or other Member
States.
4. Minimizing risk to Member State budgets: The EU ETS provides
certainty to emissions reduction from installations responsible for around
50% of EU emissions. This reduces the risk that Member States will need
to purchase additional international units to meet their international com-
mitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
3.1.2 Compliance periods
The EU ETS is divided into several compliance phases:
• The first trading phase from 2005 to 2007;
• The second trading phase from 2008 to 2012;
• The third trading phase from 2013 to 2020;
• The post 2020 phase.
The first trading phase of EU ETS was seen as a trial phase, which helped to
test the permit price formation of the European carbon market. It also helped
to establish the infrastructure for the MRV process (monitoring, reporting and
verification) of the EU ETS. The primary purpose of this phase was to ensure
that the system would be functional ahead of 2008, so that the EU Member
States would be able to meet their commitment targets under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, which would be introduced in 2008. The EU ETS Directive (EU 03)
also specified the provisions of use of international credits, which helped the
businesses to use emission reduction units generated under the Kyoto Protocol
to fulfill their compliance targets under the EU ETS. In this phase, companies
were allowed to use emission reduction units from CDM for their compliance.
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The second trading phase of EU ETS coincided with the first commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol ran from 2008 to 2012. The rules of trading of
permits as well as the initial allocation of pollution permits have differed sub-
stantially between the first two phases. The total amount of permits allocated,
was much lower in the second phase. The regulation of the transfer of pollution
permits between phases changed as well. In this phase, besides international
credits under CDM projects, businesses could also use emission reduction units
generated under JI projects to meet their targets.
The third trading phase of EU ETS runs from 2012 to 2020, which coin-
cides with the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Although the
Doha Amendment has not been ratified by sufficient nations after its agree-
ment in 2012 and therefore the second Kyoto commitment period is not yet
legally binding, the EU as an independent jurisdiction has committed to a tar-
get and tracks its own climate policy. In the current phase, significant changes
were made or are planned to improve the efficiency of the mechanism. For in-
stance, less allowances are allocated for free to the industrial and power sectors,
some short-term and long-term structural reforms are proposed to regulate the
surplus of allowances and to rebalance the supply and demand of the carbon
market.
The fourth trading phase is planned from 2021 to 2030, also known as the
post-2020 phase. Based on the historical experience and the price behavior of
the carbon permits, the European Commission presented in 2015 a legislative
proposal to revise the EU ETS for the period after 2020. The EU set its 2030
climate and energy policy framework which included a binding target to cut
emissions in EU territory by at least 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. This tar-
get was seen as part of the contribution of EU to the Paris Agreement, which
was ratified by sufficient countries and came into force on 4th November 2016.
To achieve the at least 40% EU target, all members of EU ETS have to reduce
their emissions by 43% compared to 2005 level in the sectors covered by the
ETS. For this target, the European Commission proposed a series of reforms
within the system and the proposal was currently agreed informally by the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the European council.
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3.1.3 Objective of the system
To control the global warming problem and keep the climate change below 2◦C,
the EU planned to reduce the GHG emissions by 80%-95% by 2050 compared
to 1990 levels in the context of similar reductions to be taken by developed
countries as a group. To achieve this goal, the EU suggested a roadmap for
its low carbon economy (EC 11). First, the roadmap suggested that, by 2050,
the EU should cut its emissions to 80% below 1990 levels through domestic re-
ductions alone, rather than relying on international credits. Other energy and
climate targets were set to be achieved before 2050:
The EU’s 2020 climate and energy package contains 3 key targets:
1. A reduction in EU GHG emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels;
2. 20% of EU energy consumption to come from renewable resources;
3. A 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels,
to be achieved by improving energy efficiency.
These targets were set by EU leaders in 2007 and enacted in legislation in
2009 (EU 09a), (EU 09b), (EU 09c). The 20% emission reduction target by
2020 is an objective requiring efforts from all sectors across Europe. For the
EU ETS, this target was transformed to a reduction of 21% emissions com-
pared to 2005 levels by sectors covered by the EU ETS. Non-ETS sectors also
required to reduce 10% of emissions compared to 2005. The target was set to
be compared to the year 2005, because this was the starting year of the EU
ETS. The Emission reduction targets as a part of the 2020 package for ETS
and non-ETS sectors can be seen in Figure 3.1 below.
Figure 3.1: Emission reduction targets of EU’s 2020 package for ETS
and non-ETS sectors
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The EU’s 2030 climate and energy framework sets three key targets for
the year 2030:
1. A reduction of GHG emissions by at least 40% below the 1990 level by
2030 to be achieved domestically;
2. An increase of the EU-wide renewable energy share to at least 27%; and
3. Improving energy efficiency by at least 27% by 2030, with 30% by 2030
in mind.
This framework was proposed on January 2014 and was adopted by EU
leaders in October 2014 (EC 13), (EC 14a). To achieve the at least 40% emis-
sion reduction target, sectors covered by the EU ETS would have to cut their
total emissions by 43% compared to the 2005 levels. Meanwhile, non-ETS sec-
tors would have to cut emissions by 30% compared to 2005 and this target
needs to be translated into individual binding targets for all Member States
of the EU ETS. Figure 3.2 shows the emission reduction targets of the 2030
framework for ETS and non-ETS sectors.
Figure 3.2: Emission reduction targets of EU’s 2030 framework for ETS
and non-ETS sectors
3.1.4 Other main features
The scope of the EU ETS extended since the beginning of the first trading
phase in 2005. It covered not only the Member States of the European Union,
but also most nations in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). With
the start of the first trading phase of EU ETS in 2005, all 25 EU Member
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States were within the system. This number then increased to 27 when Roma-
nia and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007. From the second trading phase in 2008,
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, known as the EFTA countries (except for
Switzerland) joined the EU ETS. These countries together with the members of
EU were known as the Member States of the European Economic Area (EEA).
In phase 3, Croatia became a Member State of EU and therefore joined the EU
ETS automatically in January 2013. Currently, there are 31 states in the EU
ETS totally.
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol defined six main GHG emissions.
However, these greenhouse gases are not all covered by the EU ETS. The first
trading phase only covered the Carbon dioxide (CO2). In the phase 2, the
Nitrous oxide (N2O) was also covered by the ETS, but was only included vol-
untarily at the discretion of EU members. In phase 3, Nitrous oxide (N2O) and
certain Perfluorocarbon (PFC) emissions were included as well from aluminum
production.
The EU ETS covered GHG emissions from mainly two carbon intensive sec-
tors, the power and the manufacturing industry. Since the first trading phase,
power stations and other combustion plants with more than 20 MW thermal
rated input, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel, cement clinker, glass and
ceramics, lime, bricks, paper and board were covered in the system. In 2012,
emissions from aviation sector was also included in phase 2. From phase 3, the
sectoral scope was expanded to aluminum sectors, carbon capture and storage,
petrochemicals and other chemicals. The aviation sector was also included in
the EU ETS within the third trading phase, but only emissions from flights
within the EEA were limited in the period 2013 to 2016.
Table 3.1 summaries the main features of the EU ETS mentioned above for
its different trading phases.
3.1.5 Registry, MRV and compliance
Registry and monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) are important sys-
tems to guarantee the EU ETS to be operated effectively. The registry keeps
track of the ownership of allowances within the EU ETS, while the MRV ensures
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Features Phase 1:
2005-2007
Phase 2:
2008-2012
Phase 3:
2013-2020
Member
States
25 EU Member
States, extended
to Romania and
Bulgaria in 2007
27 EU Member
States with Nor-
way, Iceland and
Lichtenstein
30 EEA Member
States with Croa-
tia in 2013
GHG
emissions
CO2 CO2,
N2O (voluntary)
CO2, N2O, cer-
tain PFC from
aluminum pro-
duction
Sectors Power stations
and other com-
bustion plants
> 20 MW, Oil
refineries, Coke
ovens, Iron and
steel, Cement
clinker, Glass and
ceramics, Lime,
Bricks, Paper and
board
Same as phase 1
and Aviation
Same as phase
1 and Aviation
from 2013-2016,
Aluminum, Petro-
chemicals, Ammo-
nia, Nitric, adipic
and glyoxylic acid
production, CO2
capture and trans-
port in pipelines
and geological
storage
Table 3.1: Main features of EU ETS in different trading phases
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that the compliance process of the EU ETS to be functional and transparent.
The Union registry is an electronic accounting system that accounts the
allowances issued under the EU ETS and international credits for its all sta-
tionary installations. It covers all 31 participants of the system. The Union
registry records the following data:
• The list of all installations covered by the ETS Directive and the al-
lowances assigned for free to each installation of the Member States as
well as the free allocation to aircraft operators.
• The accounts of the Member States, companies and individuals holding
allowances and eligible international credits, such as CERs and ERUs.
• All the transactions of allowances and international credits performed by
the account holders.
• The annual verified emissions of these installations and aircraft operators.
• The annual reconciliation of allowances, i.e. the number of allowances
that must be surrendered by the companies to cover their annual verified
emissions.
Since the beginning of the EU ETS, these data were recorded by the national
EU ETS registries that were formerly hosted by each country of the Member
States. The single Union registry was operated by the European Commission
on a Europe-wide level and replaced all these national registries. In order to be
able to participate in the EU ETS and perform transactions, a company or an
individual must hold an account in the Union registry.
The transaction data are recorded and authorized by the European Union
Transaction Log (EUTL). It checks the data and ensures that all transactions
of carbon permits between different accounts is consistent with EU ETS rules.
Before the activation of the Union registry, the Community Independent Trans-
action Log (CITL) was used and provided similar function to record the trans-
action data. The CITL was then replaced by the EUTL after the operation of
the Union registry in 2012.
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It is worth to mention that the Union registry is a single European registry
that records the flow of allowances and international credits of Kyoto Protocol
between different Member States within the EU ETS and from outside. Mean-
while, the International Transaction Log (ITL), administrated by the UNFCCC
under the Kyoto Protocol, accounts the transfer information of all international
credits to the countries under the EU ETS and other non-ETS countries. There-
fore, the Kyoto credits used in the EU ETS are subject to a check by both the
EUTL and the ITL.
The monitoring, reporting and verification process is also a key factor to
guarantee the EU ETS to be operated functionally. Every year, each installa-
tion or aircraft operator is required to prepare a monitoring plan and submit
it to the Competent Authority under the EU ETS. The monitoring plan must
contain information and activities of the corresponding operators to be moni-
tored and their chosen monitoring methodology, measurement systems, data
management and control procedures. Moreover, operators need to report their
annual emissions through an emission report, which contains all the data of
direct GHG emissions of the installation or the aircraft in the given year. The
report must be verified by an independent accredited verifier before it is sub-
mitted. The annual procedure of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)
is known as the EU ETS compliance cycle.
In the history of the EU ETS, the regulation for monitoring and reporting
were improved to make sure the system to be operated more effectively. The
current rules related to the compliance cycle are set out in two regulations:
The Monitoring and Reporting Regulation (MRR) - Commission Regulation
(EU) No 601/2012 (EU 12a) and the Accreditation and Verification Regulation
(AVR) - Commission Regulation (EU) No 600/2012 (EU 12b). Since the begin-
ning of the third trading phase, the MRV process has to be in line with these
two regulations.
The EU ETS compliance cycle contains the following steps:
• Operators of an installation or aircraft must prepare and submit a moni-
toring plan to their corresponding Competent Authority and their GHG
permit applications at the beginning of the year.
54
3.1 Introduction
• The monitoring plans needed to be approved by the Competent Authority.
• Operators implement their monitoring during the year and update the
plan and submit it to the Competent Authority for approval, in case the
monitoring methodology needs to be changed.
• Operators have to submit an annual GHG emissions report to the Au-
thority before it was verified by an independent verifier.
• Once the report is submitted, operators must surrender allowances before
the deadline on 30 April.
• If necessary, operators need to submit a report on improvements of the
monitoring methodology.
• Verifiers start the verification process usually in the third quarter of the
current year.
The total MRV process covers the whole calendar year. However, some
procedures such as submitting the verified emissions report and surrendering
allowances can only take place in the subsequent year. The following Figure 3.3
demonstrates the EU ETS compliance cycle according to its chronological order.
Figure 3.3: The chronological EU ETS compliance cycle
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Borrowing, banking and withdrawal
The design of compliance cycle makes it possible for companies to borrow al-
lowances from a future allocation for one year. Operators receive their free
allowances in February each year to meet their compliance of the current year,
but they have to surrender the corresponding volume of allowances at the end
of April for the previous year. Therefore, operators are allowed to use some of
their new allocated allowances, assigned by February, to cover their emissions
in the previous year at the compliance deadline by April. This operation is
technically possible and is called borrowing. Borrowing is only allowed within a
trading phase, borrowing allowances form the first year of a new trading phase
for the use of the last year of a previous trading phase is not permitted, e.g.
borrowing cannot occur between 2012 and 2013.
Conversely, operators may also have surplus of allowances at the end of a
trading year. Since the trading phase 2, operators are allowed to transfer their
unused allowances of the trading year to the subsequent trading year. This
operation is called banking. Not like borrowing, banking is permitted not only
between different trading years, but also between different trading phases since
2008. Between the second and the third phases, unlimited allowances were al-
lowed to be banked, meaning all used allowances before 2012 can be used in
phase 3. This volume was transferred to accounts of operators automatically at
no cost to them. Therefore, the volume of allowances issued in phase 3 under
the cap was added to the banked volume.
Additionally, in each trading phase, if a participant of EU ETS does not
have sufficient allowances for its annual compliance, it must be fined. This
could occur when if an operator does not have sufficient allowances and refuses
to or cannot borrow them from the subsequent year and also does not purchase
the shortfall volume from the market. The penalty is 40 for each tCO2 during
phase 1 and 100 since phase 2, adjusted with the EU inflation rate. The penalty
is imposed by the relevant authority of each member state. Furthermore, the
shortfall volume of allowances must be added to the compliance target for the
next year, or say, the shortfall volume must be withdrew from the next year’s
volume.
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3.2 Allocation of Allowances
As a cap-and-trade system, the total volume of annual greenhouse gases emit-
ted by the installations of power plants and factories and aircraft operators
covered by the EU ETS are set not to exceed a maximum limit. Such a limit
is called the cap. Once the cap is determined, companies will receive the cor-
responding volume of carbon permits, or say allowances, for their compliance.
The allowances are the rights for companies to emit the same tonnes of carbon
dioxide or other equivalent amount of greenhouse gases. The allowances are
allocated for free or auctioned to operators, so that companies are able to trade
them in the secondary market.
3.2.1 Emissions cap
Before each trading phase of EU ETS, a central cap at the EU level must be
determined by the European Commission based on the provisions of the ETS
directive (EU 03), which is the main legislation of the EU ETS. Since the EU
ETS has special rules for the aircraft operators, i.e. aviation sector can use
any kinds of allowances for compliance purposes, but stationary installations
cannot use aviation allowances. The cap in the EU ETS is usually separated
into two ways: a cap for all stationary installations and a cap for the aviation.
In phase 1 (2005-2007) and phase 2 (2008-2012), the cap was set via the Na-
tional Allocation Plans (NAPs). In these two phases, most of allowances were
allocated for free, the proportion of free allocation all installations received was
around 95% in phase 1 and then fell slightly to around 90% in phase 2. Each
Member State of EU ETS needed to prepare a document specifying the num-
ber of allowances to be allocated to its installations during the coming trading
period. The Commission assessed the documents of NAPs and approved the
number to be allocated, or amended it if necessary. The total cap was then
determined by the collection of all NAPs.
In the trading phase 3 (2013-2020), the way of determination of the cap
was changed. Around 50% of allowances in the EU ETS were planned to be
auctioned and therefore would not be allocated for free. A National Imple-
mentation Measure (NIM) was used by each Member State to replace the NAP.
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Member States were still required to submit their plans including detailed infor-
mation on allocating free allowances for their domestic installations. However,
the total cap set for phase 3 was no more fixed and would decrease each year
by applying a linear reduction factor (LRF).
The linear reduction factor was introduced to ensure the overall 20% reduc-
tion target and would result in a 21% reduction emissions within the EU ETS
by 2020 compared to 2005. Since 2013, the annual cap would decrease each year
by a linear factor of 1.74% compared to 2010. The number of total allowances
to be assigned from 2013 was determined by the following elements:
1. The number of allowances which were issued by Member States under
EU ETS in accordance with the Commission Decisions on the National
Allocation Plans of Member States for the period from 2008 to 2012. (The
decisions for each Member State can be found here https://ec.europa.
eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap_en#tab-0-1);
2. The average number of allowances which were issued each year of the
period by Member States to new installations that entered the EU ETS;
And
3. The number of allowances that takes into account the effect of the ex-
tended scope of the EU ETS, i.e. installations which were included as
from the beginning of the third trading phase in 2013.
By taking into account these factors, the quantity of cap for 2013 was cal-
culated at 2,084,301,856 allowances. Meanwhile, the linear reduction factor
implied that the amounts of the reduction was 38,264,246 each year from 2013
to 2020. This quantity of annual reduction is consistent with the 21% of emis-
sions reduction target of EU ETS by 2020. Table 3.2 shows the total annual
cap of EU ETS throughout the trading phase 3.
Unlike stationary installations, aviation sector within the EU ETS will con-
tinue to receive free emission allowances throughout the trading phase 3. The
cap on total aviation allowances for phase 3 was set at 210,349,264 originally
and would increase by 116,524 allowances per year from 2014 onwards. 82% of
this amount would be allocated to the aircraft operators for free. 15% would
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Year Annual cap Reduction volume
2013 2,084,301,856 38,264,246
2014 2,046,037,610 38,264,246
2015 2,007,773,364 38,264,246
2016 1,969,509,118 38,264,246
2017 1,931,244,872 38,264,246
2018 1,892,980,626 38,264,246
2019 1,854,716,380 38,264,246
2020 1,816,452,134 38,264,246
Table 3.2: Cap of EU ETS for trading phase 3 excluding aviation
be auctioned and the left 3% would be taken into a reserve for new entrants or
fast-growing operators. Figure 3.4 illustrates the cap in the EU ETS separated
into the stationary installations and the aviation sector.
Figure 3.4: Cap of phase 3 in stationary installations and the aviation
sector
3.2.2 Free allocation of allowances
Free allocation and auction of allowances are two main methods to assign the
carbon permits to their users in the EU ETS. Rules of free allocation were
changed in different trading phases based on different function and objective to
be achieved in each phase.
The first trading phase was considered as a learning by doing period as the
EU ETS was first established and would be tested to be functional. As a prepa-
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ration for phase 2, the phase 1 did not set any strict emissions reduction target.
Almost all allowances were allocated to the power plants and energy intensive
industries for free through grandfathering. Grandfathering means companies
receive their free allowances based on their historical GHG emissions. This
method was then criticized as it provided emitters large windfall profits and
less incentive to reduce their emissions. Then in the second trading phase, the
EU ETS needed to function effectively so that the EU was able to meet its
Kyoto commitment targets - together with other emission reductions and cli-
mate actions outside the EU ETS. The proportion of free allocation under EU
ETS fell to around 90% in this phase, most of them were allocated still through
grandfathering, but some Member States began to set their free allocations
through benchmarking. In the trading phase 3, in order to achieve the 21%
emission reduction target under EU ETS, significant changes were made by EU
on free allocation rules. These rule can be specified from the following 3 aspects.
Free allocation to industries
Industrial sectors did not receive most of their allowances for free in this phase.
In principle, free allocations decrease each year throughout the trading phase
3. How many allowances an industrial company or a sector can receive was
classified in two different ways.
First, if a sector is deemed to face a significant risk of carbon leakage from
exposure to non-Europe competition due to the carbon prices of the EU ETS,
this sector will receive 100% of its emission allowances for free throughout the
phase 3. Carbon leakage is the risk that companies will face increased costs due
to the local climate policies and therefore prefer to transfer their production
to other countries that have lower standards or cheaper measures to cut GHG
emissions. The result is that transfer of production would not help to abate-
ment and lead to an increase of global GHG emissions. According to the ETS
Directive (EU 03) (Article 10a), a sector or a sub-sector is defined to be exposed
to a significant risk of carbon leakage if the following criteria are fulfilled:
• Its direct and indirect costs induced by the implementation of the directive
would increase production cost, calculated as a proportion of the gross
value added, by at least 5%; and
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• The sector’s trade intensity with non-EU countries (imports and exports)
is above 10%.
A sector or sub-sector is also deemed to be exposed if:
• The sum of direct and indirect additional costs is at least 30%; or
• The non-EU trade intensity is above 30%.
To avoid the carbon leakage problem, a carbon leakage list of sectors and
subsectors was drawn up by the European Commission. The first list (EU 10a)
was applied for the first 2 trading years of phase 3 (2013-2014). The second
list (EU 14a) will be applied from 2015 to 2019 and the subsequent lists will be
functional for each 5 years after 2019.
Second, if a sector is not on the carbon leakage list, it will receive 80% of its
allowances for free in 2013 and the proportion will decrease gradually year-on-
year to 30% by 2020. Table 3.3 shows the share of free allocation that industry
sectors can receive in the third phase of EU ETS. Industry sectors are divided
into two categories, one includes sectors exposed to carbon leakage (C.L.) risk,
the other one not.
Year Sectors not on C.L. list Sectors exposed to C.L.
2013 80% 100%
2014 72.86% 100%
2015 65.71% 100%
2016 58.57% 100%
2017 51.43% 100%
2018 44.29% 100%
2019 37.14% 100%
2020 30% 100%
Table 3.3: Share of allocations for industries in trading phase 3 - Data
source: European Commission
Another significant change of allocation rules is that all sectors receive their
free allocations based on benchmarks, no more on grandfathering. The bench-
mark is developed for each product produced by the industrial installations.
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Generally speaking, a benchmark of a product is determined by the average
greenhouse gas emissions that the best performing 10% of the installations pro-
duce this product in the EU. Installations receive their free allocations based
on the benchmark of a product, produced by these installations. If they meet
their benchmarks, these installations will have sufficient allowances to cover
their emissions. Otherwise, they can either reduce their emissions by improving
their producing technologies or purchasing additional allowances or interna-
tional credits from the market.
As described in the previous subsection, Member States have to submit their
National Implementation Measures (NIMs) to the Commission, including the
numbers of free allowances their domestic installations need each year through-
out the third trading phase. The commission have to check the NIMs and
approve them or amend them if necessary. Countries receive their allocations
and issue the allowances to its companies annually. To make sure that the total
required free allowances and other assigned carbon permits do not exceed the
annual cap under the entire EU ETS, a cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF)
is applied to adjust the number of free allowances for the installations. This
factor reduced the free allocations by around 5.73% in 2013 and increases pro-
gressively each year to around 17.56% in 2020, as the cap decreases annually
during this period. Table 3.4 shows these factors throughout the phase 3, which
was determined by the European Commission in (EU 13).
Year CSCF
2013 94.272151%
2014 92.634731%
2015 90.978052%
2016 89.304105%
2017 87.612124%
2018 85.903685%
2019 84.173950%
2020 82.438204%
Table 3.4: The cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF) from 2013 to
2020 - Source: European Commission
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The number of free allocation for each year can be calculated by using the
following formula:
Number of allocation = Benchmark×Historical activity level× Carbon leakage
exposure factor× Cross-sectoral correction factor/Linear reduction factor,
where the benchmarks are calculated by the EC given in (EU 11), the his-
torical activity level (HAL) indicates the historical production corresponding to
the applicable benchmark, the Carbon leakage exposure factor (CLEF) is given
by Table 3.3, the Cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF) is given by Table
3.4, and the Linear reduction factor (LRF) is in line with the factor of 1.74%
specified in the previous subsection, decreasing each year from 2013 to 2020,
to electricity generators for their heat production. Detailized explanation on
calculation methodology to determine free allocation can be found in (EC 12).
Free allocation to electricity generators
Generally, power generations do not receive any allowances for free since the
beginning of the third trading phase. However, there are some exceptions for
some Member States.
In 2004, 10 countries became new Member States under EU and joined the
EU ETS automatically. They are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Latvia and Malta. These countries are
allowed to receive free allowances to compliance for their power plants, so that
they are able to prevent too sharp increases in electricity prices for domes-
tic customers and will have sufficient time for making the transition to less
carbon-intensive electricity generations. Under the ETS Directive, the level of
free allocation in 2013 must not exceed 70% of the allowances needed to cover
emissions from the power sector of these countries. This level will decrease
yearly and will reach 0% by 2020. All of these countries are eligible to receive
free derogation volume, but Latvia and Malta chose not to it. The other 8
courtiers drawn up plans setting out investments to be financed through the
free allocation with aim to modernizing their electricity sectors.
Free allocation to aviation sector
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Aviation sector joined the EU ETS since 1 January 2012. In the same year, 85%
of allowances were allocated for free based on its benchmarks. For the phase
3 from 2013 to 2020, 82% of all allowances are to be allocated for free based
on benchmarks and 15% are to be auctioned. The remaining 3% constitutes a
special reserve for new entrants and fast growing airlines.
3.2.3 Auction
Almost all allowances allocated in the first and second trading phases of EU
ETS were free of charge, only a small portion was assigned through auction-
ing. However, auction design and organization in these two phases was not
determined centrally by the European Commission, but individually by a few
Member States of EU. In phase 1, Member States were allowed to auction up
to 5% of the emission allowances, but only four countries chose to use auc-
tion among all 27 countries of EU ETS. Three of them, Hungary, Ireland and
Lithuania used single-round, sealed-bid, uniform-price auctions, while Denmark
originally planned to auction 5% of its allocation, but then decided to sell the
allowances through the brokered market instead of auctioning after its assess-
ment. The explanation for this decision was that a professional broker would
have the ability to sell the bulk of the allowances in high-price periods, which
was deemed better than if unprofessional government officials decided when
to sell (Faze 08). Table 3.5 indicates the quantity of allowances set aside for
auctioning by these countries in the first trading phase. In total, the amount
of allowances auctioned by Hungary, Ireland and Lithuania only took around
0.2% of all allowances allocated for free.
Country Allowances Percentage
Hungary 1420000 2.5%
Ireland 502201 0.75%
Lithuania 552000 1.5%
Denmark 5025000 5%
EU ETS 7499201 0.2%
Table 3.5: Quantity of allowances set aside for auctioning of EU ETS
in phase 1 - Data source: European Commission
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Then in the second trading phase, the proportion of auction allowed was up
to 10%. Four countries, Austria, Germany, Netherland and UK used auction
partially instead of free allocation. Their auctions were also designed in favor of
a single-round, sealed-bid, uniform-price mechanism. Their annual quantity for
auctioning can be seen in Table 3.6 below. In total, the quantity of allowances
auctioned amounts to around 4% of all allocation during this period (BCKS 10).
Country Allowances Percentage
Austria 400000 1.3%
Germany 40000000 9%
Netherland 3200000 3.7%
UK 17000000 7%
EU ETS 89400000 4%
Table 3.6: Annual quantity of allowances to be auctioned in phase 2 -
Data source: European Commission
Since 2013 of phase 3, auctioning is considered to be the default method
of allocation within the EU ETS. The Commission increased the proportion of
auction sharply in this period, especially to the power sector. For power plants,
all allowances are to be auctioned, only eight Member States can receive free
allocations partially under certain rules described in the previous subsection.
However, the proportion of free allocation for these eight countries decreases
each year and will be 0% by 2020. In industry sector, a transition to auctioning
takes place progressively. Sectors deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage risk
still receive 100% of allowances for free. Other industry sectors receive 80% of
free allowances in 2013, and this percentage decreases to 30% in 2020 progres-
sively. Allowances not allocated for free are to be auctioned for them. In the
aviation sector, 15% of allowances in circulation will be auctioned throughout
the period. In total, over 40% of allowances were through auctioning in 2013
and this proportion is to be increased over the period. During the third trading
phase from 2013 to 2020, about 57% of total amount of allowances are to be
auctioned. This proportion is estimated by the European Commission and it
implies an amount of 8,176,193,157 of allowances.
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The establishment of an auction mechanism was stated in the revised EU
ETS Directive (EU 09c) in 2009. Detailed rules of auctioning of allowances is
governed by the EU ETS Auctioning Regulation (EU 10b). According to Article
10(1) of the Directive, the allowances to be auctioned have to be distributed in
three different ways:
• 88% of the allowances are to be auctioned in 2013 to 2020 are distributed
to the EU Member States on the basis of their share of verified emissions
from EU ETS installations in 2005 or the average of the 2005-2007 period,
whichever one is the highest;
• 10% are allocated to the least wealthy EU Member States as an additional
source of revenue to help them invest in reducing the carbon intensity of
their economies and adapting to climate change;
• The remaining 2% is given as a ‘Kyoto bonus’ to nine EU Member States
which by 2005 have reduced their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20%
of levels in their base year or period. These are Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
In this phase, countries under the EU ETS have the flexibility to choose
to perform auction on an opt-out platform, or on a common auction platform.
Currently, Germany, Poland and UK chose to use their own auction platforms
and other Member States are using the common platform. Germany appointed
European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig as its auction platform. The UK
appointed Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in London as its auction platform.
Poland did not have its own platform and therefore chose to contract EEX to
auction on its behalf. The EEX was also appointed as the common auction
platform for the other countries under EU ETS since beginning of 2013. On 13
July 2016, the EEX was reappointed by the Commission to auction general and
aviation allowances as the common platform on behalf of 25 Member States for
another period of up to five years. Each year, ICE and EEX have to publish
an auction calendar with exact dates and volumes of general allowances and
aviation allowances to be auctioned per Member State. And they also have to
publish information on the auction results after each auction was performed.
Table 3.7 specifies where, when and how often the auctions are taking place.
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Participants Platform Auction time
25 Member States/
EEA EFTA states
EEX Weekly on Mondays,
Tuesdays and Thursdays
Germany EEX Weekly on Fridays
Poland EEX Monthly on Wednesdays
UK ICE Fortnightly on Wednesdays
Table 3.7: Timing, place and frequency of EU ETS auctions
Based on the auction regulation and information described above, the amount
of general allowances to be auctioned in the period from 2013 to 2020 can be
calculated approximately and therefore can be used by the Commission on de-
termining the annual auction calendar. This amount can be seen in Figure
3.5 below. The auction volume is calculated under the consideration of back-
loading mechanism of EU ETS. The back-loading mechanism is a structural
reform measure of EU ETS and it means to freeze the auctioning of some CO2
allowances, so as to raise the carbon price and thus encourage companies under
EU ETS to invest in low-carbon innovation. This will be specified in subsection
3.4.1 of this chapter.
Figure 3.5: Estimated amount of allowances to be auctioned in phase 3
Data source: European Commission
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3.3 Trading Permits and Price Behavior
3.3.1 European Union Allowances
The Commission as the central authority allocates carbon permits free of charge
or sells them via auction to operators. Operators are required to hold permits
in amount equal to their emissions for compliance. In case of lack of permits,
operators have to buy additional permits from the market. Or operators with
surplus of permits can choose to sell them in the market to increase their pro-
fits. The European Union Allowance (EUA) is officially the carbon permits
used within the EU ETS and represents a permit to emit one tCO2. For the
aviation sector, the European Union Aviation Allowance (EUAA) is an emis-
sion right that used to cover emissions by allowed airlines. Following types of
EUA products can be traded in the market:
EUA spots: the spot trade means the purchase or sale of EUA for immedi-
ate delivery. Under the EU ETS, the spot date should take place within two
business days after the trade is agreed. A spot contract is in contrast with a
contract of financial derivatives, which usually has its delivery and payment at a
future time. This means that spot trading is currently not regulated as financial
instruments at the EU level by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID). Therefore, exchanges packaged emission allowances spot trading as
financial instruments, called daily futures, so that spot trading is also able to
be supervised under MiFID. Both ICE and EEX offer EUA spot daily futures
for market participants.
EUA forwards: this is a contract made by two parties to buy or sell an
amount of EUAs on a future date. A forward contract can be understood as
an unstandardized futures contract which takes place over-the-counter (OTC)
instead of via an exchange.
EUA futures: this is a standardized contract between two parties to buy or
sell an amount of EUAs with delivery and payment on a future date. The con-
tract is negotiated at a futures exchange, with acts as an intermediary between
the two parties.
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EUA options: this gives the buyers of the option the right, but not the obli-
gation to trade an amount of EUAs at a fixed price on a future date. Call and
put options are both offered by the ICE and EEX to participants for hedging
their risks and managing their carbon permit portfolios.
EUA swaps: an EUA swap does not have the same meaning with a normal
swap in a financial market, which allows a party to change its exposure or risk
from floating prices to fixed prices. This is a derivative contract allows a party
to change an amount of EUAs for the same quantity of international credits.
Both EUAs and international credits are eligible for compliance, but interna-
tional credits have usually lower prices compared to EUAs and therefore have
to be discounted by trading. This means sellers of EUAs can receive credits as
well as price differential between the two units. Another form of swap contract
used in the EU ETS is the so-called maturity swap. Maturity swaps describe
swaps between allowances or credits of the same type with different delivery
dates. For example, a company can sell spot allowances and buy forward al-
lowances at the same time to avoid price risks.
For the aviation sector, ICE and EEX also offer the EUAA futures. Ad-
ditionally, EEX provides EUAA OTC trade registration. However, no options
are provided by both of the exchanges.
Trading EUAs can be engaged directly between two parties referred to as
over-the-counter (OTC) or through exchanges. Operators are also able to auc-
tion EUAs via ICE or EEX. The most participants are operators from energy or
industry companies with compliance purpose as well as financial intermediaries.
In principal, any participant with an account in the EU registry can engage the
trading. The changes in holding of their emission allowances are recorded in the
registry by the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL). The trading volume
of EUAs increased sharply each year in the first and second trading phases, but
decreased since the third phase as shown in Figure 3.6.
3.3.2 International credits
Beside EUAs, international credits created by the Kyoto Protocol can be also
used for compliance in the EU ETS. The credits are from two Kyoto projects:
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Figure 3.6: Trading volume of EUAs from 2005 to 2015 Source: European
Commission EU ETS factsheet, Sep. 2016. Originally data from Bloomberg LP,
ICE, EEX, NYMEX, Bluenext, CCX, Greenmarket, Nordpool, and UNFCCC.
• The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows industrialized coun-
tries, defied as Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol, to invest in
projects in developing countries and help them to reduce their domestic
emissions. The industrialized countries receive then a certain number of
saleable Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits, generated by the
project and use them for their own compliance.
• The Joint Implementation (JI) allows Annex I countries of the Kyoto
Protocol to meet part of their required emission reduction targets by
paying for projects in other Annex I countries. The JI projects provide
for the creation of emission reduction units (ERUs).
Each unit of CERs and ERUs are equivalent to one tonne of CO2e, and
both can be used to fulfill part of reduction targets under the EU ETS until the
end of phase 3. However, the usage of the credits is under certain qualitative
and quantitative restrictions.
Under the qualitative restrictions, the EU legislation specifies that both
credits can be used from all types of projects with the following exceptions:
• Land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects;
• Nuclear projects;
• Large hydropower projects with more than 20MW of installed capacity
subject to certain conditions;
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• HFC-23 destruction projects (as of 1 May 2013); and
• N2O destruction projects from adipic acid production (as of 1 May 2013).
Additionally, CERs and ERUs representing emissions reductions achieved
after 31 December 2012 are prohibited. CERs generated from CDM projects
registered after that date are only eligible in the EU ETS if the projects are
hosted in least-developing countries as defined by UN. ERUs from JI projects
after that date cannot be used for compliance in countries that have not ratified
the second Kyoto commitment period.
Under the quantitative restrictions, the usage of international credits is re-
gulated by the EU legislation for different trading periods and sectors.
In phase 2, credits were permitted up to a percentage determined by the
National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for different installations. Aviation opera-
tors have a limit up to 15% of their surrender obligation. All unused credits
were transferred directly into phase 3. In total, around 1.06 billion international
credits were used in phase 2.
For phase 3, the maximum quantity of eligible international credits each
installation can use must fulfill the following conditions:
• Installations which already fell into the scope of the EU ETS in the period
2008 to 2012 may use credits in the period 2008 to 2020 up to a limit of
11% of their allocation for 2008 to 2012;
• New entrants in the period starting in 2013 and installations which did
not fall under the EU ETS in the period until 2012, and thus did not
receive any allocation, may use credits up to a limit of 4.5% of their
verified emissions in the period 2013 to 2020; and
• Aviation operators may use project credits up to a limit of 1.5% of their
verified emissions in the period 2013 to 2020.
Furthermore, the total use of credits from 2008 to 2020 is not allowed to
exceed 50% of the total overall reductions below 2005 levels made by the sec-
tors under the EU ETS. In phase 3, both credits are no longer compliance units
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within the EU ETS and therefore must be exchanged for EU allowances.
3.3.3 Price behavior
Trading carbon permits is active in both primary and secondary market. The
primary market is defined as the market, which brings new carbon permits into
itself, either through free allocation and auction in case of EUAs, or through the
CDM and the JI projects in case of CERs and ERUs. The secondary market
means that the market trades already issued allowances and credits. In practice,
the trading volume in the secondary market is more than in the primary market.
Both EUAs and CERs can be traded in the spot and futures markets, but
the trading volume of EUAs in the futures market is far greater than in the
spot market. Currently, carbon products are mainly tradable on the following
four exchanges:
• The Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in London,
• The European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig,
• The NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe (NOMX) in Oslo, and
• The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in New York.
The ICE has by far the most market share of traded EUAs. Previous
exchanges such as the Bluenext, the Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA), the
Climex and the Greenmarket-Exchange have suspended the emission trading
business. Table 3.8 specifies the carbon products in these exchanges in the pri-
mary and the secondary market.
On the secondary market by 2013, ICE took a share of 93.31% of overall
EUA traded volume and is clearly the biggest player in the market. The other
3 market players only had a market share of 6.69%. Figure 3.7 shows the share
of traded volume of each exchange.
Comparing traded volume on different types of contracts, it can be con-
cluded that the futures are by far the most traded contracts in the EU ETS.
The traded volume of spot, futures and options on EUA, CER and ERU in
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Exchanges EUA EUAA CER ERU
ICE Auctions (UK),
Spot, Futures,
Options
Auctions (UK),
Futures
Spot, Futures,
Options
Futures, Options
EEX Auctions (Ger-
many, Poland,
EU), Spot,
Futures
Auctions (Ger-
many, Poland,
EU), Spot,
Futures
Spot, Futures Futures
NOMX Spot, Futures,
Options
- Spot, Futures,
Options
-
NYMEX Spot, Futures,
Options
Futures Futures, Options Futures, Options
Table 3.8: Emission products in exchanges
Figure 3.7: Share of traded volume of exchanges in 2013 Data source:
DEHSt, originally from Point Carbon.
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2012 and 2013 can be seen in Table 3.9 below.
Product/Year 2012 2013
Spot 195 1100
Futures 7066 7797
Options 830 502
Table 3.9: Traded volume of carbon products on EUA, CER and ERU
in Mt. - Data source: DEHSt, originally from Point Carbon.
Furthermore, the share of their traded volume are illustrated in Figure 3.8
below. The inner ring displays the share of traded volume in 2012, while the
outer ring displays the share of traded volume in 2013. In both years, futures
contracts take the most market share (85% in average) and are therefore most
liquid. Therefore, EUA futures price is considered as the benchmark of carbon
permits of EU ETS by the market participants.
Figure 3.8: Share of traded volume in Mt. of 2012 (inner ring) and
2013 (outer ring) Data source: DEHSt, originally from Point Carbon.
As described in subsection 3.3.1, a futures contract on EUA is an agreement
to buy or sell a tonne of emission allowance at a certain time in the future for a
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certain price on the ICE Futures Europe electronic platform. The most liquid
contract is the futures contract with maturity in December of the same year. It
expires always on the last Monday of the contract month. If the last Monday
is a non-business day or there is a non-business day in the 4 days following the
last Monday, the last day of trading will be the penultimate Monday of the de-
livery month. The settlement price is weighted average during the daily closing
period from 16:50:00 - 16:59:59 hours of UK local time with quoted settlement
prices if the liquidity is low. Figure 3.9 shows the front year futures prices with
maturity in December and the corresponding traded volume from 22 April 2005
to 23 December 2016.
Figure 3.9: EUA front year futures contract prices and traded volume
Data source: ICE, Bloomberg.
Follows is the EUA price behavior and its background:
• The first price collapse was in the middle of 2006, when the first market
assessment report of EU showed that EUA allowances were over-allocated.
And the price decreased until the end of the first trading phase to only a
few cents.
• Since the second trading phase, the price rose continuously as a result of
more stringent caps set by the EU until Summer of 2008, then fell rapidly
again due to the global financial and economic crisis.
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• The price was relative stable thereafter for the next two years from middle
2009 to 2011, then rose slightly in March 2011. This was due to the nuclear
disaster in Japan and consequently resulted in the political decision of
Germany to shut down all nuclear plants, which increased the demand of
fossil fuel worldwide and therefore also the demand of EUA allowances in
EU.
• Thereafter, the price fell down rapidly again since middle 2011 due to
the debt crisis in southern Europe and an increasing use of international
credits of CERs and ERUs until the end of the second trading phase in
December 2012.
• During the third trading phase since 2013, a series of political decisions
was made to rebalance the market. The political decisions had a bullish
effect on EUA prices not only from a fundamental but also from a senti-
mental aspect. Therefore, the EUA prices rose slightly again.
These political decisions mentioned above, including mainly the back-loading
mechanism and the market stability reserve, will be specified in the subsequent
section.
3.4 Reform of EU ETS and Outlook
The over-allocation of emission allowances in the EU ETS is a significant issue
to be addressed, overwise it will undermine the market balance and lead a
low carbon price. This caused the EUA price collapse in the first trading
phase and low prices in the second and third trading phases. Although banking
unused carbon permits is allowed since the second trading phase, a surplus of
emission allowances built up within the system since the second trading phase,
particularly since 2009 due to two main reasons.
• The the economic crisis in 2008 effected the production process EU-wide
and therefore reduced the demand on EUAs.
• Without stringent restrictions, international credits were largely imported
and resulted in a large band of emission allowances.
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This resulted in a surplus amounted to around 2 billion allowances at the
start of trading phase 3 and increased further to more than 2.1 billion in 2013.
Therefore, various reform measures were adopted or still in plan to address the
over-allocation problem.
3.4.1 Structure reform in phase 3
During trading phase 3, two main decisions were made by EU as short-term
and long-term measure respectively.
As the short-term measure, a back-loading is implemented to postpone the
auctioning of 900 million allowances until the end of the current trading phase
from 2019 to 2020. The total auction volume is redistributed during phase 3.
First, the auction volume from 2014 to 2016 has to be reduced annually by
• 400 million allowances in 2014;
• 300 million allowances in 2015; And
• 200 million allowances in 2016.
The postponed volume of allowances will be reinjected into the auction vo-
lume in 2019 and 2020 respectively. 300 million will be released in 2019 and then
600 million in 2020. The proposal of back-loading was implemented through an
amendment to the EU ETS Auctioning Regulation in (EU 14b), which entered
into force on 27 February 2014.
According to the Commission’s impact assessment in (EC 14b), the pur-
pose of implementation of back-loading is to rebalance the market supply and
demand and also to reduce the price volatility in a short term. However, if 900
million allowances are reinjected into the auction volume from 2019 to 2020, it
could cause a market over supply and increase the price volatility. Therefore,
EC’s proposal is to put this postponed volume into a reserve directly, so that it
is not possible to effect the market balance to any extent. This reserve is called
market stability reserve (MSR), and it is considered as a long-term measure to
solve the allowance surplus issue.
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As the long-term measure, the market stability reserve will be implemented
by 2019 with aim to reduce the allowance auction volume in case of an allowance
surplus for a long period. The MSR is also designed to improve the system’s
resilience to major shocks by adjusting the supply of allowances to be auctioned
in the future, according to the impact assessment of EC in (EC 15b). Besides,
unallocated allowances will also be transferred to the reserve. According to the
estimation of EC in (EC 15b), there will be around 550 to 700 million allowances
unallocated by 2020. Moreover, the MSR will also regulate the surplus volume
on the market as of 2019. Follows are the key provisions of MSR summarized
from the legislative proposal of the European Commission on this issue.
• The market stability reserve will be established in 2018 and the placing
of allowances in the reserve will operate from 1 January 2019;
• The quantity of 900 million allowances deducted from auctioning volumes
during the period 2014-2016, is not to be added to the volumes to be
auctioned in 2019 and 2020. Instead, they will be placed in the MSR;
• Unallocated allowances during the trading period have also to be placed
in the reserve in 2020;
• Each year, a number of allowances equal to 12% of the total number of
allowances in surplus will be deducted from the auction volume, unless
the number of allowances to be placed in the reserve would be less than
100 million.
• In 2019 for the reserve’s operation, placements take place between 1 Jan-
uary and 1 September of the year of 8% (representing 1% for each calendar
month) of the total number of allowances in surplus;
• In any year, if the total number of allowances in surplus is less than
400 million, 100 million allowances will be released from the reserve and
added to the volume of allowances to be auctioned. If the allowances in
the reserve are fewer than 100 million, all of them have to be released.
The legislative proposal of MSR is approved by the European Parliament
and the Council in October 2015 in (EU 15). In the decision, the market surplus
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is defined as the total number of allowances in circulation (TNAC), which is
calculated by the following formula:
TNAC = Total Supply− (Total Demand + Allowances in the MSR),
where the supply of emission allowances consists of the allowances banked from
phase 2, the auctioned allowances, the allowances allocated for free and the
allowances in the New Entrants Reserve, while the demand is determined by
the emissions of the installations and the cancelled allowances.
3.4.2 Outlook for post 2020 phase
The emission reduction target of EU ETS in the post 2020 phase is bound
with the objective of EU’s 2030 climate and energy framework, which aims
to reduce GHG emissions by at least 40% domestically below the 1990 level
by 2030. To achieve the at least 40% target, all sectors covered by the ETS
have to reduce their emissions by 43% compared to 2005. For this purpose the
current linear reduction factor used to determine the cap has to be adjusted.
Therefore, in July 2015 the European Commission presented a legislative pro-
posal in (EC 15c) to revise the provisions of EU ETS for the period after 2020.
The overall quantity of allowances will decline by 2.2% every year starting from
2021, instead of the original linear reduction factor (LRF) at 1.74%. According
to EC, the additional emission reduction by this revise amounts to around 556
million tonnes from 2020 to 2030.
As the total number of allowances is declining, the total number of free
allocation needs to be revised as well. EC also proposed to change the cross-
sectoral correction factor (CSCF) to ensure the total allocation remains below
the cap. According to the EC’s proposal, the basic architecture will remain
in place in the post 2020 period, while individual elements will be improved
based on the benchmark values, the production data, the carbon leakage risk
and the indirect carbon costs of the sectors and individual companies. In total,
EC estimates that around 6.3 billion allowances to be allocated for free during
this period.
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Except for adjusting of LRF and CSCF, two support mechanisms are also
planned to be set up to help the industry and the power sectors covered by the
EU ETS. These are:
• The Innovation Fund. The Innovation Fund is to be established to support
investments in renewable energy, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and
low-carbon innovation in energy intensive industry. Around 450 million
allowances are expected to be set aside to support the fund.
• The Modernisation Fund. The aim of the Modernisation Fund is to sup-
port lower income Member States of EU ETS in meeting the high invest-
ment needs relating to energy efficiency and the modernisation of their
energy systems. Between 2021 and 2030, it is expected that around 310
million allowances in total could be set aside to establish the fund.
As the next step the legislative proposal for revising the EU ETS in the
post 2020 period by EC is submitted to the European Parliament and to the
Council for adoption, so that the proposal is able to enter into force.
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ETS and its Derivative
Since the launch of the EU ETS in 2005, it keeps being the world’s largest
carbon market. The system is based on a cap-and-trade mechanism, which is
considered to be cost efficient and effective to reduce emissions. Quantitative
analysis on carbon permit prices are widely conducted and are useful for un-
derstanding the price behavior from the perspective of mathematical finance.
This chapter will focus on the financial modelling of carbon permits of EU ETS.
Existing pricing model will be discussed and new extended model will be inves-
tigated.
4.1 Background and Introduction
Before proceeding with the quantitative modelling, it is important to under-
stand the purpose of choosing a cap-and-trade system. According to the the-
oretical arguments, a properly designed emission trading system based on the
cap-and-trade mechanism will help to reduce the GHG emissions and achieve
the low social costs. Such a mechanism works as follows: A central regulation
authority determines the total quantity of emission allowances based on the
historical emission data of all installations of the operators that covered by the
system and allocates the corresponding amount of allowances to them. Each
operator receives the allowances at the beginning of the compliance period and
manages to have sufficient amount of allowances to cover its emissions polluted
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during the trading period and have to surrender them at the compliance dead-
line. If one operator fails to submit enough allowances by compliance, it has to
face a penalty which applies for each tonne of uncovered eCO2. Since the cap
has been set, no additional carbon permits can be created in the system. In case
of lack of total emission allowances, operators have two options for their com-
pliance. Either they can choose to reduce their emissions or to buy them from
the market to avoid penalty. This helps to create the demand for allowances on
the market and therefore determines a carbon price. Finally, the market will
choose the most effective way for achieving this target. This means that the
buyers are charged by purchasing allowances and the sellers are rewarded for
improving their producing process and reducing their total emissions. In this
way, the market finds the cheapest source for reduction target and achieves the
lowest costs.
This mechanism can be illustrated by using a classic toy model. Assuming
there are only two operators in the system and they are regulated by a cen-
tral authority. The authority collects the emission data of the operators and
calculates their emission reduction costs. It has the following data:
• Operator A emits 1000 tonnes of CO2 each year in average and will afford
20 Euro for its abatement costs, i.e., to pay 20 Euro for reducing one tonne
of CO2.
• Operator B emits 1500 tonnes of CO2 each year and has to pay 10 Euro
for its abatement costs.
Usually, the abatement costs can be expressed as a function of the reduc-
tion volume. The more emissions the operators choose to reduce, the lower they
have to pay for each tonne of CO2 to be abated. And in theory, the carbon
price is then determined as the marginal abatement costs. However, we do
not consider a variable abatement cost in this toy model and simply assume a
fixed abatement cost. Assuming that the authority decides to reduce the total
emissions by 5% annually. Therefore, it allocates each operator 95% of their
allowances they actually need and set a penalty level at 40 Euro. The authority
has two options for its regulatory instrument to control the total emissions. It
can either use the command and control regulation and obligates both operators
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Scenario 1: C&C system Scenario 2: C&T system
Operator A Operator B Operator A Operator B
Original emissions 1000 t 1500 t 1000 t 1500 t
Abatement costs 20 e 10 e 20 e 10 e
Reduction volume 50 t 75 t 0 t 125 t
Compliance costs 1000 e 750 e 750 e 500 e
Total social costs 1750 e 1250 e
Table 4.1: Comparing individual and social abatement costs between
command and control and cap-and-trade systems - The carbon permit price
is set at 15 Euro.
to reduce their emissions by 5% each (scenario 1), or it can choose the cap-and-
trade scheme by applying trading, so that emission allowances are able to be
transferred between individual operators (scenario 2). In Table 4.1 we compare
the individual and social costs from both options.
In the first scenario, both operators have to choose to reduce their emissions
in order to avoid penalties, which are more expensive to them. Each operator
faces its own abatement costs and this results a total reduction costs at 1750
Euro. In the second scenario by allowing tradable carbon permits, operators
will behave differently. Operator A is willing to buy allowances at a price lower
than 20 Euro, while Operator B is willing to sell the allowances at a price higher
than 10 Euro. Therefore, operator B will choose to abate the total volume of
emissions and sell the corresponding abatement volume to operator A. And an
allowance price at any level between 10 and 20 would facilitate the transaction.
Suppose in this case the carbon price would be 15 Euro, this results a total
social costs of 1250 Euro. And each operator can realize compliance target at
lower costs. In this sense, the market helps to achieve the abatement target
in a cost efficient way. Studies on tradable permits would help to lead to deep
understanding of emission trading mechanism.
In the EU ETS, besides EUA allowances on the spot market, futures and
options on allowances are being traded and have more traded volume on the
secondary market, see Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.8. Various authors have dis-
cussed the design of the market and the pricing of the permits and the deriva-
tives traded. The fundamental concepts for emission trading and the market
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mechanism have been reviewed in the paper of Taschini in (Tasc 09), which
also provides a literature overview. Equilibrium models for allowance permit
markets have been widely used to capture the theoretical properties of emission
trading schemes. Examples are the dynamic but deterministic model proposed
by Rubin in (Rubi 96) and stochastic equilibrium approaches such as Seifert et
al. in (SeUW 08), Wagner in (Wagn 06) and Carmona et al. in (CaFH 09).
These models use optimal stochastic control to investigate the dynamic emis-
sion trading in the risk-neutral framework. Carmona et al. (CFHP 10) derive
the permit price formula which can be described as the discounted penalty mul-
tiplied by the probability of the excess demand event. Its historical model fit
has been evaluated by Gru¨ll and Taschini in (GruT 09). Carmona and Hinz
in (CarH 11) and Hinz in (Hinz 10) propose a reduced-form model which is
particular feasible for the calibration of EUA futures and options as it directly
models the underlying price process. Both Paolella and Taschini (PaoT 08) and
Benz and Tru¨ck (BenT 09) provide an econometric analysis for the short-term
spot price behavior and the heteroscedastic dynamics of the price returns. For
the option pricing, Carmona and Hinz in (CarH 11) derive a option pricing
formula from their reduced-form model for a single trading period. They also
discuss the extension of the formula to two trading periods. Hitzemann and
Uhrig-Homburg in (HitU 11a) and (HitU 11b) develop an option pricing model
for multi-compliance periods by considering a remaining value component in
the pricing formula capturing the expected value after a finite number of trad-
ing periods.
As emission certificates are traded assets, their price paths carry information
on the market participant expectations on the development of the fundamental
price drivers of the certificates including the regulatory framework. In partic-
ular, prices of futures and options of certificates carry forward-looking infor-
mation which can be extracted by using appropriate valuation models. In this
chapter we derive such a model by extending the reduced-form pricing model
of Carmona and Hinz in (CarH 11). Using an extensive data set we extract a
time series for the implied market price of risk, which relates to the risk pre-
mium the investors attach to the certificates. This requires a calibration of the
model to historical price data during varying time periods and with different
maturities of futures and options. A crucial step in the calibration procedure
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is a price transformation of normalized futures prices of permits from a pric-
ing measure to the historical measure. We find that the implied market price
of risk possesses stochastic characteristics. Therefore, we extend the existing
reduced-form model by modelling the dynamics of the market price of risk as
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and show that the extended model captures the
appropriate properties of the market. The market price of risk is an implied
value related to the permit prices, this requires an extension of the univariate
permit pricing model to a bivariate one. In this context, the standard Kalman
filter algorithm is considered to be an effective way to calibrate to the histo-
rical prices. We apply this methodology and estimate the implied risk premia.
Once the risk premia have been determined, EUA option prices can be derived
to fit the bivariate model setting, which helps to improve the accuracy of pricing.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, a basic reduced-form
model of Carmona and Hinz in (CarH 11) based on a risk-neutral framework
will be introduced. The model with an extended data series will be calibrated
and the calibration results will be analyzed. In section 3 an extended bivariate
pricing model will be investigated in order to capture the market information
of the risk premia. By demonstrating how to calibrate the extended model by
applying the standard Kalman filter algorithm, the estimation results of this
procedure will be presented and the model fit will be discussed. In section 4,
the option pricing performance will be evaluated by taking into account the
calibration results of the bivariate model.
4.2 Univariate EUA Pricing Model and Parameter
Estimation
4.2.1 Univariate model
We consider an emission trading scheme with a single trading phase with hori-
zon [0, T ]. The price evolution of emission permits is assumed to be adapted
stochastic processes on a filtered probability space (Ω,F, (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) with an
equivalent risk-neutral measure Q ∼ P. Based on the assumption of a market
compliance at time T the price has only two possible outcomes, namely zero or
the penalty level. The argument is as follows. If there are sufficient emission
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allowances in the market to cover the total emissions at compliance time, sur-
plus allowances will become worthless. Otherwise, for undersupplied permits
the price will increase to the penalty level.
The reduced-form model of Carmona and Hinz (CarH 11) will be introduced
as follows. Consider the price process of a EUA futures contract (At)t∈[0,T ]
with maturity data T written on the allowance price. N ⊂ FT denotes the
non-compliance event which settles the {0, p}-dichotomy of the terminal fu-
tures price by AT = p1N , where p is the penalty level. Let (Γt)t∈[0,T ] be the
aggregated normalized emission, then the non-compliance event is denoted by:
N = (ΓT ) ≥ 1.
Therefore, under the equivalent martingale measure Q one has
At = pEQ[1N |Ft] = pEQ[1{ΓT≥1}|Ft], t ∈ [0, T ].
To simplify the notation, one considers the normalized futures price process
(at)t∈[0,T ] given by
at =
1
p
At = EQ[1{ΓT≥1}|Ft], t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.1)
Furthermore, by using the notation N(µ, σ2) for the normal distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2, and using Φ for the cumulative distribution function
of the standard normal distribution, one receives the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.1. Let the process (Γt)t∈[0,T ] denote the aggregated normalized
emission, and is assumed to follow a lognormal process given by
Γt = Γ0e
∫ t
0 σsdW˜s− 12
∫ t
0 σ
2
sds, Γ0 ∈ (0,∞),
where σt stands for the volatility of the emission pollution rate. t ↪→ σt is a
deterministic function which is continuous and square-integrable. (W˜t)t∈[0,T ] is
a Brownian motion with respect to Q. Then the martingale
at = EQ[1{ΓT≥1}|Ft], t ∈ [0, T ]
is given by
at = Φ
Φ−1(a0)
√∫ T
0 σ
2
sds+
∫ t
0 σsdW˜s√∫ T
t σ
2
sds
 , (4.2)
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and it solves the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dat = Φ
′(Φ−1(at))
√
ztdW˜t, (4.3)
with the function t ↪→ zt, t ∈ (0, T ), given by
zt =
σ2t∫ T
t σ
2
udu
. (4.4)
However, the author only provides a proof idea for the proposition in the
original paper. A complete proof is given as follows.
Proof. First one has
at = EQ[1{ΓT≥1}|Ft] = Q{ΓT ≥ 1|Ft}
= Q
{
Γte
∫ T
t σsdW˜s− 12
∫ T
t σ
2
sds ≥ 1|Ft
}
= Q
{
ln Γt +
∫ T
t
σsdW˜s− 1
2
∫ T
t
σ2sds ≥ 0|Ft
}
= Q
{∫ T
t
σsdW˜s ≥ − ln Γt + 1
2
∫ T
t
σ2sds|Ft
}
= Q
{
Nˆ ≥ − ln Γt + 1
2
∫ T
t
σ2sds|Ft
}
where Nˆ ∼
(
0,
∫ T
t
σ2sds
)
= Q
{
Nˆ ≤ ln Γt − 1
2
∫ T
t
σ2sds|Ft
}
= Q
{
Nˆ ≤ ln Γt − 1
2
∫ T
t
σ2sds
}
.
Note that Nˆ is normally distributed, the equation above becomes
at = Φ
 ln Γt − 12 ∫ Tt σ2sds√∫ T
t σ
2
sds

= Φ
 ln(Γ0e∫ t0 σsdW˜s− 12 ∫ t0 σ2sds)− 12 ∫ Tt σ2sds√∫ T
t σ
2
sds

= Φ
 ln Γ0 + ∫ t0 σsdW˜s − 12 ∫ T0 σ2sds√∫ T
t σ
2
sds

= Φ
 ln Γ0 − 12 ∫ T0 σ2sds√∫ T
0 σ
2
sds
√∫ T
0 σ
2
sds√∫ T
t σ
2
sds
+
∫ t
0 σsdW˜s√∫ T
t σ
2
sds
 .
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Now taking into account the initial condition of at in the last equation:
a0 = Φ
 ln Γ0 − 12 ∫ T0 σ2sds√∫ T
0 σ
2
sds
 ,
(4.2) can be obtained. To show (4.3), define
at = Φ(ξt), t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.5)
One has
ξt =
ln Γt − 12
∫ T
t σ
2
sds√∫ T
t σ
2
sds
=
ln Γ0 − 12
∫ T
0 σ
2
sds+
∫ t
0 σsdW˜s√∫ T
t σ
2
sds
= ln Γ0
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 1
2
− 1
2
∫ T
0
σ2sds
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 1
2
+
∫ t
0
σsdW˜s
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 1
2
.
Therefore, by computing the Itoˆ differential, one obtains
dξt = − 1
2
ln Γ0
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 3
2
(−σ2t )dt−
1
2
(
−1
2
)∫ T
0
σ2sds
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 3
2
(−σ2t )dt
− 1
2
∫ t
0
σsdW˜s
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 3
2
(−σ2t )dt+
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 1
2
σtW˜tdt
=
1
2
ln Γt − 12
∫ T
t σ
2
sds√∫ T
t σ
2
sds
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)−1
σ2t dt+
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 1
2
σtdW˜t
=
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)− 1
2
σtdW˜t +
1
2
ξt
(∫ T
t
σ2sds
)−1
σ2t dt
=
√
ztdW˜t +
1
2
ztξtdt,
with the quadratic variation d[ξt] = (dξt)
2 = ztdt. Now by applying the Itoˆ’s
formula, one can derive the differential of the normalized futures price as
dat = Φ
′(ξt)dξt +
1
2
Φ′′(ξt)(dξt)2
= Φ′(ξt)
(√
ztdW˜t +
1
2
ztξtdt
)
+
1
2
Φ′′(ξt)(dξt)2
=
1
2
(Φ′(ξt)ξt + Φ′′(ξt))ztdt+ Φ′(ξt)
√
ztdW˜t
= Φ′(ξt)
√
ztdW˜t
= Φ′(Φ−1(at))
√
ztdW˜t,
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since Φ(x) is a monotonically increasing function. The penultimate equation is
satisfied by using the result Φ′(x)x+ Φ′′(x) = 0. Actually, we have
Φ(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e−
s2
2 ds ⇒ Φ(x)′ = 1√
2pi
e−
x2
2
⇒ Φ(x)′′ = 1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 (−x) ⇒ Φ′(x)x+ Φ′′(x) = 0.
In order to calibrate the model, Carmona and Hinz (CarH 11) suggest to
use the function
zt = β(T − t)−α,
with α ∈ R and β ∈ (0,∞), so one has
dat = Φ
′(Φ(at))
√
β(T − t)−αdW˜t. (4.6)
To estimate the parameters one has to determine the distribution of the price
variable. For this purpose one considers the price transformation process ξt
defined by at = Φ(ξt) in (4.5). By applying Itoˆ’s formula one has
dξt =
(
1
2
ztξt +
√
zth
)
dt+
√
ztdWt, (4.7)
where Wt denotes the Brownian motion under the objective measure P and h
is the market price of risk which is assumed to be constant. Now consider two
different time points t and τ with 0 < t < τ < T . From the expression of ξt in
the proof above it is easy to see that ξτ can be given explicitly as a function of
ξt:
ξτ = e
1
2
∫ τ
t zsdsξt +
∫ τ
t
e
1
2
∫ τ
s zudu
√
zsdW˜s. (4.8)
Then one receives the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.2. Under the objective measure P equation (4.8) reads
ξτ = e
1
2
∫ τ
t zsdsξt + h
∫ τ
t
e
1
2
∫ τ
s zudu
√
zsds+
∫ τ
t
e
1
2
∫ τ
s zudu
√
zsdWs. (4.9)
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Proof. Generally, the price transformation ξt has the dynamics given by
dξt = (
1
2
ztξt +
√
ztλt)dt+
√
ztdWt,
with a time-varying market price of risk λt. In order to solve the Stochastic
differential equation, consider the functions defined by
g(t) = e−
1
2
∫ t
0 zsds, f(t, ξt) = ξtg(t).
By applying Itoˆ’s formula one obtains
df(t, ξt) = g
′(t)ξtdt+ g(t)dξt
= −1
2
ztg(t)ξtdt+ g(t)(
1
2
ztξt + λt
√
zt)dt+ g(t)
√
ztdWt
= g(t)λt
√
ztdt+ g(t)
√
ztdWt.
Thus the left hand side of the function f(t, ξt) can be written as the integral
form
f(t, ξt) = f(0, ξ0) +
∫ t
0
g(s)λt
√
zsds+
∫ t
0
g(u)
√
zudWu
= ξ0g(0) +
∫ t
0
g(s)λt
√
zsds+
∫ t
0
g(u)
√
zudWu.
Note that at t = 0, g(0) = 1. The right hand side of the function f(t, ξt) equals
ξtg(t) = ξte
− 1
2
∫ t
0 zsds = ξ0 +
∫ t
0
e−
1
2
∫ s
0 zs′ds
′
λt
√
zsds+
∫ t
0
e−
1
2
∫ u
0 zu′du
′√
zudWu.
Then the SDE of ξt can be solved as
ξt = ξ0e
1
2
∫ t
0 zsds +
∫ t
0
e
1
2
∫ t
0 zs′ds
′
e
1
2
∫ 0
s zs′ds
′
λt
√
zsds+
∫ t
0
e
1
2
∫ t
0 zu′du
′
e
1
2
∫ 0
u zu′du
′√
zudWu
= ξ0e
1
2
∫ t
0 zsds +
∫ t
0
e
1
2
∫ t
s zs′ds
′
λt
√
zsds+
∫ t
0
e
1
2
∫ t
u zu′du
′√
zudWu
= ξ0e
1
2
∫ t
0 zsds +
∫ t
0
e
1
2
∫ t
s zs′ds
′
λt
√
zsds+
∫ t
0
e
1
2
∫ t
s zs′ds
′√
zsdWs,
which means that for any given τ with 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ≤ T , ξτ has the solution
ξτ = ξte
1
2
∫ τ
t zsds +
∫ τ
t
e
1
2
∫ τ
s zs′ds
′
λt
√
zsds+
∫ τ
t
e
1
2
∫ τ
s zs′ds
′√
zsdWs.
The proposition is then proved by taking a constant λt.
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Consequently, for each i = 1, 2, ..., n, the conditional distribution of ξti given
ξti−1 is Gaussian with mean µi and variance σ
2
i given by
µi = e
1
2
∫ ti
ti−1 zsdsξti−1 + h
∫ ti
ti−1
e
1
2
∫ ti
s zudu
√
zsds,
σ2i =
∫ ti
ti−1
zse
∫ ti
s zududs.
Now ξt is conditional Gaussian so that its log-likelihood can be calculated and
the Maximum-likelihood estimation can be applied to find the model parame-
ters.
4.2.2 Estimation
Suppose µi and σ
2
i are functions of the variables h, α, β mentioned in the pre-
vious subsection. By using the following integral approximations, parameters
of the log-likelihood can be calculated numerically:
µi ∼ e
1
2
(ti−ti−1)zti−1 ξti−1 + h(ti − ti−1)e
1
2
(ti−ti−1)zti−1√zti−1 ,
σ2i ∼ (ti − ti−1)zti−1e(ti−ti−1)zti−1 ,
with zti = β(T − ti)−α, i = 1, 2, ..., n. One can calibrate the model to different
emission trading periods during the first and second EU ETS trading phases.
Consider the daily prices of the EUA futures with maturities in December from
2005 to 2012. Their historical price series are shown in Figure 4.1.
The price transformation ξt is conditional Gaussian with its mean µt and
variance σ2t . We consider the daily historical observations of the EUA futures at
time t1, t2, ...tn. Their corresponding price transformations can be determined
by using the definition at = Φ(ξt). Thus the parameters α, β, h can be estimated
by maximizing the log-likelihood function given by
Lξti ,...,ξtn (h, α, β) =
n∑
i=1
(
−(ξti − µi(h, α, β))
2
2σ2i (α, β)
− ln
(√
2piσ2i (α, β)
))
. (4.10)
Under the model assumptions the residuals
wi =
ξti − µi(h, α, β)√
σ2i (α, β)
, i = 1, ..., n, (4.11)
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Figure 4.1: Historical prices of the EUA futures with maturities in
December from 2005 to 2012
must be a series of independent standard normal random variables. So stan-
dard statistical analysis can be applied to test the quality of the model fit. The
estimation results are shown in Table 4.2. The horizons of the price data are
two years, starting from the first trading day in January of the previous trading
year to the last trading day in December of the next year.
Comparing the estimation values in Table 4.2, the instability of the para-
meter values in each cell for different time periods can be observed. Note the
value for the market price of risk changes its sign during the first and second
trading phase. This implies the inappropriateness of the assumption for a con-
stant market price of risk. The fourth value in each cell is the negative of LLF.
Note the -LLF are much lower after the first trading phase because the price
collapse during 2006 to 2007 partially affects the data.
In Figure 4.2 to Figure 4.6 we display the time series of the residuals wi, their
empirical auto-correlations, empirical partial auto-correlations and quantile-
quantile-plots. The EUA futures with maturity in December 2007 (EUA 07)
and EUA futures with maturity in December 2012 (EUA 12) are chosen as ex-
amples.
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The time series wi show an effect of volatility clustering. This is confirmed
by significant values to high lags in the sample autocorrelation and sample par-
tial autocorrelation. Also the Q-Q plots, especially for the first trading phase,
indicate heavy tails and a non-Gaussian behavior. A formal analysis with an
application of Jarque-Bera test rejects the hypothesis that the data set is gene-
rated from normally distributed random variables. In order to improve the
model fit, we extend the model by introduction of a dynamic market price of
risk in the subsequent section.
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Figure 4.2: Statistical analysis of EUA 07, time period 05-06 and 06-07.
Figure 4.3: Statistical analysis of EUA 12, time period 05-06 and 06-07.
Figure 4.4: Statistical analysis of EUA 12, time period 07-08 and 08-09.
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Figure 4.5: Statistical analysis of EUA 12, time period 09-10 and 10-11.
Figure 4.6: Statistical analysis of EUA 12, time period 11-12.
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4.3 Bivariate Pricing Model for EUA
4.3.1 Model description
In order to illustrate the dynamic property of the market price of risk we con-
sider a bivariate permit pricing model in this section. We model the market
price of risk as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process as its value can be either posi-
tive or negative and denote it by λt. Recall the equation for the normalized
price process under the risk-neutral measure Q given by (4.3). According to
Girsanov’s theorem, the bivariate pricing model under the objective measure P
is given by
dat = Φ
′(Φ−1(at))
√
zt(λtdt+ dW
1
t ),
dλt = θ(λ¯− λt)dt+ σλdW 2t ,
dW 1t dW
2
t = ρdt.
where W 1t and W
2
t are two one-dimensional Brownian motions with correlation
coefficient ρ. Note that under the model assumptions, the filtration (Ft) in the
probability space must be assumed to be generated by the bivariate Brownian
motion.
The use of Girsanov’s theorem in the bivariate model requires the condition
that the process Zt given by
Zt = exp
(∫ t
0
λsdWs − 1
2
∫ t
0
λ2sds
)
(4.12)
is a martingale. The following proposition can be proved.
Proposition 4.3.1. Under the model assumptions, the process Zt given by
(4.12) is a martingale.
Proof. In order to show the martingale property in (4.12), it is sufficient to
prove the Novikov’s condition given by
E
[
exp
(1
2
∫ T
0
λ2sds
)]
<∞.
In the bivariate EUA pricing model, where λt follows a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-
Proces given by
dλt = θ(λ¯− λt)dt+ σλdWt,
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this condition is always satisfied. We first show that there exists a constant
 > 0 such that for any S ∈ [0, T ], we have
E
[
exp
(1
2
∫ S+
S
λ2tdt
)]
<∞. (4.13)
To show (4.13) we consider the term in the expectation notation. By applying
Jensen’s inequality we have
exp
(1
2
∫ S+
S
λ2tdt
)
= exp
(∫ S+
S
1


2
λ2tdt
)
= exp
(1

∫ S+
S

2
λ2tdt
)
≤ 1

∫ S+
S
exp
( 
2
λ2t
)
dt.
By applying Fubini’s theorem (4.13) becomes
1

∫ S+
S
E
[
exp
( 
2
λ2t
)]
dt. (4.14)
The process λt is a Gaussian process with mean and variance given by
E[λt] = µt = λ0e−θt + λ¯(1− e−θt),
Var(λt) = σ
2
t =
σ2λ
2θ
(1− e−2θt).
We have λt ∼ N(µt, σ2t ). Now let Z be a standard normal-distributed random
variable Z ∼ N(0, 1). So in (4.14) we have
E
[
exp
( 
2
λ2t
)]
= E
[
exp
( 
2
(µt + σtZ)
2
)]
= E
[
exp
(µ2t
2
+ µtσtZ +
σ2tZ
2
2
)]
=
∫
R
exp
(µ2t
2
+ µtσtx+
σ2t x
2
2
) 1√
2pi
exp
(
− x
2
2
)
dx
= exp
(µ2t
2
)∫
R
1√
2pi
exp
(
− 1− σ
2
t
2
x2 + µtσtx
)
dx.
To calculate the integration term above, let at = 1 − σ2t and bt = µtσt, and
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make the integral-substitution. Then we have∫
R
1√
2pi
exp
(
− 1− σ
2
t
2
x2 + µtσtx
)
dx
=
∫
R
1√
2pi
exp
(
− 1
2
(atx
2 − 2btx)
)
dx
=
∫
R
1√
2pi
exp
(
− 1
2
(
y2 − 2bt 1√
at
y
)) 1√
at
dy
=
1√
at
∫
R
1√
2pi
exp
(
− 1
2
(
y2 − 2bt√
at
y +
( bt√
at
)2 − ( bt√
at
)2))
dy
=
1√
at
exp
( b2t
2at
)∫
R
1√
2pi
exp
(
−
(y − 2bt√at )2
2
)
dy
=
1√
at
exp
( b2t
2at
)
.
According to the assumptions at = 1 − σ2t is positive and the expectation is
convergent for a small  and its value is
E
[
exp
( 
2
λ2t
)]
=
1√
at
exp
(µ2t
2
)
exp
( b2t
2at
)
=
1√
1− σ2t
exp
(µ2t
2
)
exp
( 2µ2tσ2t
2− 2σ2t
)
.
Thus the integral in (4.14) is finite and the exponential term in (4.13) is inte-
grable.
In order to show Zt is a martingale we first consider that Zt is a local
martingale, hence it is a supermartingale. Therefore, Zt is a martingale if and
only if the condition E[Zt] = 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], is satisfied. This martingale property
can be shown by induction. Suppose E[Z0] = 1 which is trivial and E[Zt] = 1
for t ∈ [0, S] for S < T . Let now t ∈ [S, S + ] and set
ZtS = exp
(∫ t
S
λsdWs − 1
2
∫ t
S
λ2sds
)
.
According to Novikov condition and (4.13), ZtS is a martingale. Then we have
E[Zt] = E[ZSZtS ] = E[E[ZSZtS ]|FS ] = E[ZSE[ZtS |FS ]] = E[ZSZSS ] = E[ZS ],
since
ZSS = exp
(∫ S
S
λsdWs − 1
2
∫ S
S
λ2sds
)
= exp(0) = 1.
It follows
E[Zt] = E[ZS ] = 1 for t ∈ [S, S + ].
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Then we have E[Zt] = 1 for t ∈ [0, S + ]. Repeat this induction for T−S
times we have E[Zt] = 1 for t ∈ [0, T ], which implies Zt defined in (4.12) is a
martingale.
To calibrate the model we use the transformed price process to avoid com-
plex numerical calculations in the calibration procedure. The bivariate model
can be reformulated as
dξt =
(
1
2
ztξt +
√
ztλt
)
dt+
√
ztdW
1
t , (4.15)
dλt = θ(λ¯− λt)dt+ σλdW 2t , (4.16)
dW 1t dW
2
t = ρdt. (4.17)
In SDE (4.16), λ¯ represents the long-term mean value. θ denotes the rate with
which the shocks dissipate and the variable reverts towards the mean. σλ is the
volatility of the market price of risk. The price transformation has been proved
to be conditional Gaussian and its SDE can be solved explicitly.
4.3.2 Calibration to historical data
We consider the discretization of the model (4.15)-(4.17). By assuming con-
stant volatility terms in the time interval [tk−1, tk], the model equations can be
discretized under Euler’s scheme given by
ξtk =
√
ztk−14tλtk−1 +
(
1 +
1
2
ztk−1
)
ξtk−1 +
√
ztk−14tE1tk , (4.18)
λtk = (1− θ4t)λtk−1 + θλ¯4t+ σλ
√
4tE2tk , (4.19)
Cov(E1tk ,E
2
tk
) = ρ, (4.20)
where 4t = tk − (tk−1), namely the time interval, and E1tk , E2tk ∼ N(0, 1). ztk
can be modeled by using the function β(T − tk)−α. The model parameter-set
is therefore ψ = [θ, λ¯, σλ, ρ, α, β].
As λtk is a hidden state variable related to the price transformation, and
only values of ξtk at time points t1, t2, ...tn can be determined from the market
observations, the market price of risk series can be estimated by applying the
Kalman filter algorithm. We have chosen to use the transformation process
instead of the normalized price atk . Because of the linear form of Equations
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(4.18) and (4.19) the standard Kalman filter algorithm is considered to be an
efficient method for the model calibration. A detailed procedure to apply the
standard Kalman filter can be found in (Harv 89). To apply the Kalman filter
model Equations (4.18)-(4.20) must be put into the state space representation
to fit the model framework. The measurement equation links the unobservable
state to observations. It can be derived from (4.18) and (4.19). After some
manipulations, the state space form of the model can be rewritten as
Stk =
√
β(T − tk)−α4tλtk +
(
1 +
1
2
(β(T − tk)−α)
)
ξtk +
√
β(T − tk)−α4tE¯1tk ,
(4.21)
λtk = (1− θ4t− σλρ4t)λtk−1 + σλ
√
(1− ρ2)4tE¯2tk
+
[
θλ¯4t− σλρ√
β(T − tk)−α
((
1 +
1
2
(β(T − tk)−α)
)
ξtk−1 − ξtk
)]
,
(4.22)
where E¯1tk and E¯
2
tk
are independent, standard normally distributed random vari-
ables.
To achieve this form consider the equations (4.18)-(4.20). We want to put
the model into the state space form. Price transformation depends on the
current level of the market price of risk, which is an unobservable variable and
therefore must be modeled in the equation of λtk . We first let
E1tk = E¯
1
tk
, E2tk =
√
1− ρ2E¯2tk + ρE¯1tk ,
where E¯1tk and E¯
2
tk
are both random variables of the standard normal distribution
as well. This fact can be easily seen since we have
Cov(E¯1tk , E¯
2
tk
) = Cov
(
E1tk ,
E2tk − ρE1tk√
1− ρ2
)
= Cov
(
E1tk ,
E2t−k√
1− ρ2
)
+ Cov
(
E1tk ,−
ρE1tk√
1− ρ2
)
= 0.
Note that
√
ztk−14tλtk−1 +
(
1 +
1
2
ztk−1
)
ξtk−1 +
√
ztk−14tE1tk − ξtk = 0.
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Multiplying −σλρ(ztk−1)−
1
2 at the both sides of the equation and sum it to the
equation of λtk , it follows that
λtk = (1− θ4t)λtk−1 − σλρ4tλtk−1 + θλ¯4t,
− σλρ√
ztk−1
((
1 +
1
2
ztk−1
)
ξtk−1 − ξtk
)
+ σλ
√
4tE2tk − σλ
√
4tρE1tk
= (1− θ4t− σλρ4t)λtk−1 +
[
θλ¯4t− σλρ√
ztk−1
((
1 +
1
2
ztk−1
)
ξtk−1 − ξtk
)]
+ σλ
√
4t
√
1− ρ2E2tk .
This is the transition equation in the state space form, and the measurement
equation is given by
Stk = ξtk+1 =
√
ztk4tλtk +
(
1 +
1
2
ztk
)
ξtk +
√
ztk4tE1tk .
For the estimation of the parameter vector ψ = [θ, λ¯, σλ, ρ, α, β] consider
the variable ξtk . In each iteration of the filtering procedure, the conditional
mean E[ξtk |ξt1 , ..., ξtk−1 ] and the conditional variance V ar(ξtk |ξt1 , ..., ξtk−1) can
be calculated. We denote the mean and variance by µtk(ψ) and Σtk(ψ), respec-
tively. The joint probability density function of the observations is denoted by
f(ξt1:n |ψ) and is given by
f(ξt1:n |ψ) =
n∏
k=1
1√
2piΣtk(ψ)
exp
(
−(ξtk − µtk(ψ))
2
2Σtk(ψ)
)
,
where ξt1:n summarize the observations from ξt1 to ξtn . Its corresponding log-
likelihood function is given by
Lobs(ψ|ξt1:n) = −
n
2
log 2pi − 1
2
n∑
k=1
log Σtk(ψ)−
1
2
n∑
k=1
(ξtk − µtk(ψ))2
Σtk(ψ)
. (4.23)
The estimation results, their standard errors, t-tests and p-values can be
found in Table 4.3. Figure 4.7 shows the estimation results of the market price
of risk, compared with the price transformation and the historical futures price.
In Figure 4.8, a negative correlation between the price transformation and the
market price of risk can be seen. The market price of risk is the return in excess
of the risk-free rate that the market wants as compensation for taking the risk.
It is a measure of the extra required rate of return, or say, a risk premium, that
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Parameter Coeff Std Err t-test p-value
θ 1.5130 0.3195 5.7601 0.0000
λ¯ 0.4091 0.6117 4.0641 0.0001
σλ 0.2913 0.0193 17.6365 0.0000
ρ 0.0017 0.0016 9.0910 0.0000
α -1.5772 0.0256 61.5603 0.0000
β 0.0172 0.0005 35.6312 0.0000
Table 4.3: Test of model parameters at significance level of 5%, sample
size 1536
investors need for taking the risk. The more risky an investment is, the higher
the additional expected rate of return should be. So in order to achieve a higher
required rate of return, the asset must be discounted and thus will be sold at
a lower price. For more economical explanations of the market price of risk see
e.g. (Hull 09) and (Wilm 06) 1. Figure 4.8 reveals this inverse relationship.
Figure 4.7: MPR, futures price and price transformation from 01.2007 to 12.2012.
Moreover, we use the mean pricing errors (MPE) and the root mean squared
1See (Hull 09), Ch. 27. or (Wilm 06), Ch. 30.
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Figure 4.8: Negative correlation of MPR and price transformation.
Maturity MPE RMSE
1 month -0.0153 0.0182
3 months -0.0208 0.0234
6 months -0.0366 0.0397
9 months -0.1273 0.1302
Table 4.4: Performance of MPE and RMSE with 2000 observations
errors (RMSE) given by
MPE =
1
N
N∑
ti=1
(ξ¯ti,τ − ξti,τ ),
RMSE =
(
1
N
N∑
ti=1
(ξ¯ti,τ − ξti,τ )2
) 1
2
,
respectively, to assess the quality of model fit. Here N denotes the number of
observations, ξ¯ti,τ is the estimated price to maturity τ , and ξti,τ is the observed
price. Their values can be seen in Table 4.4. The absolute values of MPE and
RMSE increase with time but still remain very low even 9 months before the
maturity. Therefore, the conclusion is that the model is able to reproduce the
price dynamics.
Figure 4.9 shows the standard statistical test results of the residuals by
taking into account the dynamic market price of risk. Comparing with the re-
sults from Figure 4.2 to Figure 4.6, the time series of the residuals is relative
stable with smaller variance. The sample auto-correlations and sample partial
auto-correlations reveal very weak linear dependence of the variables at different
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time points. Also, the Q-Q plot indicates a better fit of a Gaussian distribution.
Figure 4.9: Statistical tests for the residuals.
4.4 Option Pricing and Market Forward Looking In-
formation
A general pricing formula of a European call is given by
Ct = e
− ∫ τt rsdsEQ[(Aτ −K)+|Ft],
where {rs}s∈[0,T ] stands for a deterministic rate, At denotes the futures price,
K ≥ 0 is the strike price, and τ ∈ [0, T ] is the maturity. The normalized price
process at is given by at = At/p, where P denotes the penalty for each ton of
exceeding emissions, and therefore we have At = pΦ(ξt). A call option price
formula written on EUA has been derived by Carmona and Hinz in (CarH 11)
under the assumption of a constant market price of risk. Under the assumption
of a dynamic market price of risk, the option price formula is coherent with the
formula of Carmona and Hinz given by
Ct = e
− ∫ τt rsds ∫
R
(pΦ(x)−K)+ϕ(µt,τ , σ2t,τ )dx,
where ϕ stands for the density function of a standard normal distribution. Here
µt,τ and σ
2
t,τ are the parameters of the distribution of ξt, which is conditional
Gaussian. Under the risk neutral measure Q, µt,τ and σ2t,τ are given by
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µt,τ = e
1
2
∫ τ
t zsdsξt, σ
2
t,τ =
∫ τ
t
zse
∫ τ
s zududs.
In the following example, the penalty level is p = 100, the initial time t = 0
starts in April 2005. EUA futures has maturity T on the last trading day in
2012. The European calls written on EUA futures with a strike at K = 15
and maturity T will be considered under a constant interest rate at r = 0.05.
Figure 4.10 shows the call option prices and the futures prices. The red curve
stands for the option prices under dynamic MPR while the green curve stands
for the option prices under constant MPR.
Figure 4.10: Futures price and call option prices with K = 15 from 2005 to 2012.
To measure the impact of the dynamic market price of risk on the EUA
option for different strikes we calculate the option price in the univariate and
bivariate model setting respectively. Durations from 1, 3, 6 and 12 months to
maturity are chosen for calls written on EUA 2012. The results are plotted
in Figure 4.11. The red curve stands for the option prices evaluated by the
bivariate model and the green curve by the univariate model. The blue line
is the corresponding futures price at the given time. In most cases, one is in-
terested in the option prices by which their corresponding strike prices are near
the underlying prices. According to the figure, the option prices in different
model settings coincide except for a interval around the corresponding futures.
In a short time before the maturity of EUA 2012, Figure 4.11 shows a price
overestimation by the constant MPR. This result is consistent with the result
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shown in Figure 4.10, where we take the strike K = 15 as a sample path.
Figure 4.11: Call option prices comparison for durations of 1, 3, 6, 12 months
on EUA 2012 for different strikes.
Moreover, one notes that the call price process with constant MPR deve-
lops below the call process with dynamic MPR in the first trading phase before
2008 and then increases slowly and moves to the upside of the call process with
dynamic MPR during the second trading phase, before both processes vanish
to the maturity because of lower underlying prices. The reason for the price
underestimation before 2008 and overestimation thereafter can be explained as
the assumption of a constant MPR in the whole trading periods and thus causes
a neglect on the information of the market participants. Due to the regulatory
framework of the carbon market, certificates carry information on the market
participants expectations on the development of the fundamental price drivers.
Since the implied risk premia increase with time and exceed their ‘average’ level
in 2008, asset price must be discounted to compensate the higher risk. By using
appropriate valuation models, this risk premia and the forward-looking infor-
mation carried by prices of futures and options of certificates can be extracted.
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4.5 Further Discussion on Modelling EUA Prices
4.5.1 Introduction of pricing theory
For modelling the EUA prices, Carmona et al. in (CFHP 10) has developed a
stochastic equilibrium model of allowance price by assuming n individual com-
panies. All companies behave in a way that their expected terminal wealth,
by buying or selling an optimal number of allowance permits and producing an
optimal quantity of goods, can be maximized. Meanwhile, a fictitious central
planner can also minimize its expected total costs by producing an optimal
quantity of goods. The optimization problems of Carmona et al. in (CFHP 10)
are formulated in the way that profits and costs are expressed in time-T cur-
rency, which has the advantage that no discount factors could appear in the
formulae of the optimization problems. The paper first proved that such a op-
timal solution exist, then it also derived a formula of time-t futures price of
emission allowances given by
Ft,T = P · E[1Non-Compliance Event|Ft], (4.24)
where P denotes the penalty fee that has to be paid for each tonne of emission
not covered by a emission allowance at the compliance time T . The stochastic
equilibrium model of Carmona et al. is of special interest because 1:
• The model captures the main characteristics of an ordinary scheme;
• It is possible to derive the permit price formula analytically; and
• It is also the basis for the reduced-form model that can be used for pa-
rameter estimation in practice.
Generally, the non-compliance event can be expressed by the aggregated
cumulative emission process, denoted by q[0,T ]. The non-compliance event is
then given by {q[0,T ] > N}, where N is the total amount of allowance per-
mits allocated by the policy regulator to the relevant companies, i.e. the cap.
Therefore, (4.24) can be expressed as
Ft,T = P · P[q[0,T ] > N |Ft]. (4.25)
1See explanation of Gru¨ll in (Grue 10).
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Intuitively, the time-t futures price of EUA allowance is given by the penalty
multiplied by the probability of a permit shortage at the end of the compliance
period.
The model of Chesney and Taschini in (CheT 12) specifies the process for
the cumulative emissions in the frame work of Carmona et al. in (CFHP 10).
Even though the model of Chesney and Taschini is developed independently
from the model in the paper of Carmona et al., it can be categorized as a model
in the general framework of it. In the paper of Chesney and Taschini, the
emission process is described by an emission rate Qt, which follows a geometric
Brownian motion given by
Qt = Q0 exp
{(
µ− σ
2
2
)
t+ σWt
}
,
where µ and σ are the two parameters of the geometric Brownian motion and
Wt denotes the standard Brownian motion. Therefore, the cumulative emissions
in the time period [0, t] are given by
q[0,t] =
∫ t
0
Qsds.
This means that the cumulative emissions are expressed by the integral over a
geometric Brownian motion for which no closed-form density is available. The
model of Chesney and Taschini approximates the cumulative emissions in the
time interval [t1, t2] ⊆ [0, T ] by a linear approximation given by
q[t1,t2] ≈ Qt2(t2 − t1).
Furthermore, assuming that interest rate r is deterministic and there is no
convenience yield as shown by Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner in (UhrW 09), the
theoretical permit price from (4.25) is given by
St = P e
−r(T−t) · P[q[0,T ] > N |Ft].
By applying the linear approximation, it can be proved that the permit price
St at 0 ≤ t ≤ T has the following formula:
St =

P e−r(T−t) if q[0,t]≥N
P e−r(T−t) · Φ
− ln( 1T−t[N−q[0,t]Qt ])+(µ−σ22 )(T−t)
σ
√
T−t
 if q[0,t]<N .
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Moreover, the model of Gru¨ll and Kiesel in (GruK 10) extended the model
of Chesney and Taschini by using another two approximation approaches for
the cumulative emissions:
• The log-normal (moment matching)
q[t1,t2] ≈ logN(µL(t1, t2), σ2L(t1, t2));
• The reciprocal gamma (moment matching)
q[t1,t2] ≈ IG(αIG, βIG),
where the parameters µL(t1, t2) and σ
2
L(t1, t2) and αIG and βIG are chosen such
that the first two moments of logN(µL(t1, t2), σ
2
L(t1, t2)) and IG(αIG, βIG),
respectively, match those of q[t1,t2]. Then according to (Grue 10), the derivation
of the allowance permit price for these two different approximation approaches
is split up into the following three steps:
1. Compute the first two moments of q[t1,t2] =
∫ t2
t1
Qsds.
2. Derive the parameters of the random variables that are used to approxi-
mate the cumulative emissions.
3. Derive the permit price formula for the two different moment matching
approaches.
4.5.2 Choosing appropriate cumulative emission process
In stead of modelling the emission rate, it is also possible to model the emis-
sion process directly. Follow the idea that the allowance price is calculated by
multiplying the penalty and the probability of a permit shortage at the end of
the compliance period, consider the aggregated cumulative emission process as
a subordinator Gt,T for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . If other notations remain the same, then
time-t futures price of allowance permit is given by
Ft,T = P · P[G0,T > N |Ft],
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where the subordinator Gt,T of aggregated cumulative emission process starts at
the beginning of the compliance period. Then from the natural characteristics
of a subordinator it is easy to see that
St = P e
−r(T−t) · P[G0,T > N |Ft] (4.26)
= P e−r(T−t) · P[G0,t +Gt,T > N |Ft]
= P e−r(T−t) · P[Gt,T > N −G0,t]
= P e−rτ · P[Gτ > N −G0,t],
where τ = T − t denotes the rest of lifetime to the compliance deadline.
Consider the case that the cumulative emission process follows the inverse
Gaussian subordinator IGt. The inverse Gaussian subordinator is defined as a
stochastic process with
• (IGt − IGs) and (IGk − IGl) are stochastic independent ∀t > s ≥ k >
l ≥ 0.
• (IGt− IGs) is inverse Gaussian distributed, i.e. (IGt− IGs) ∼ IG(g(t)−
g(s), η(g(t)−g(s))2), ∀t > s ≥ 0 and g(t) is a monotone increasing function
with g(t) > 0, ∀t > 0.
Let g(0) = 0 and IG0 = 0, then we have IGt ∼ IG(g(t), ηg(t)2) with
mean g(t) and variance g(t)/η. The density function of an inverse Gaussian
distribution IGt is given by
fX(x; g(t), ηg(t)
2) =
√
ηg(t)√
2pix
3
2
exp
(
−ηg(t)
2(x− g(t))2
2g(t)2x
)
. (4.27)
And we can derive the cumulative distribution function of an inverse Gaussian
distributed random variable.
Proposition 4.5.1. If the density of a random variable is given by (4.27), then
its cumulative distribution function is given by
FX(x; g(t), ηg(t)
2) = Φ
(√
η
x
(x− g(t))
)
+ exp (2ηg(t))Φ
(
−
√
η
x
(x+ g(t))
)
,
(4.28)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of standard normal.
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Proof. Only the proof idea will be given here. Let ϕ(·) be the density function of
a standard normal distributed random variable. If the cumulative distribution
function of an inverse Gaussian distributed random variable is given by (4.28),
then we have
∂FX
∂x
=ϕ
(√
η
x
(x− g(t))
)(√
η
x
(x− g(t))
)′
+ exp(2η g(t))ϕ
(
−
√
η
x
(x+ g(t))
)(
−
√
η
x
(x+ g(t))
)′
=
1√
2pi
exp
(
− η
2x
(x− g(t))2
)(1
2
√
ηx−
1
2 +
1
2
√
η g(t)x−
3
2
)
+
1√
2pi
exp(2ηg(t)) exp
(
− η
2x
(x+ g(t))2
)(
−1
2
√
ηx−
1
2 +
1
2
√
η g(t)x−
3
2
)
=
√
η g(t)x−
3
2√
2pi
exp
(
− η
2x
(x− g(t))2
)
=
√
ηg(t)√
2pix
3
2
exp
(
−ηg(t)
2(x− g(t))2
2g(t)2x
)
.
Now consider the probability P[IGt > N˜ ] for some N˜ ∈ R, then from
Proposition 4.5.1 it is not difficult to see that
P[IGt > N˜ ] = 1− P[IGt ≤ N˜ ] = 1− FX(N˜)
= Φ
(√
η
N˜
(g(t)− N˜)
)
− exp (2ηg(t))Φ
(
−
√
η
N˜
(g(t) + N˜)
)
.
According to the limit behavior of IGt, if t is large, e.g. one considers t as
the days to maturity, then ηg(t) is large and IGt is approximately normal
distributed with mean g(t) and variance g(t)/η. This yields
P[IGt > N˜ ] = 1− P[IGt ≤ N˜ ] ≈ 1− Φ
N˜ − g(t)√
g(t)
η

= Φ
(√
ηg(t)−√ηN˜√
g(t)
)
= Φ
(√
ηg(t)−
√
ηN˜√
g(t)
)
. (4.29)
In particular, if we assume g(t) = νt, ν > 0, then (4.29) becomes
P[IGt > N˜ ] = Φ
(
√
ηνt−
√
ηN˜√
νt
)
. (4.30)
112
4.5 Further Discussion on Modelling EUA Prices
The event {IGt > N˜} means the cumulative emissions will excess the thres-
hold level N˜ at time t. If we denote T
N˜
by the time the cumulative emissions
is more than N˜ , then we have
P[T
N˜
< t] = P[IGt > N˜ ] = Φ
(
√
ηνt−
√
ηN˜√
νt
)
.
Therefore, by using the approximate results, the allowance permit price in (4.26)
can be expressed by the following formula:
St = P e
−rτ · Φ
(√
ηντ −
√
η(N −G0,t)√
ντ
)
. (4.31)
Formula (4.31) provides an alternative way to model the allowance price ap-
proximately. Unlike the model in (CheT 12) and (GruK 10), it does not model
the emission rate and use the integral to calculate the cumulative emissions,
but model the aggregated cumulative emission process directly. And then use
the limit behavior of the Inverse Gaussian process to reformulate the shortage
probability so that a relative simpler price formula can be derived.
Furthermore, consider (4.29) in the following way:
P[IGt > N˜ ] = Φ
(
√
ηνt−
√
ηN˜√
νt
)
= Φ
√ηN˜
( t
N˜/ν
) 1
2
−
(
N˜/ν
t
) 1
2

= Φ
(
1
α
[(
t
β
) 1
2
−
(
β
t
) 1
2
])
,
with α =
√
ηN˜
−1
and β = N˜/ν. One notes immediately that this is the
cumulative distribution function of a Birnbaum-Saunders distribution with α
being the shape parameter and β being the scale parameter. The Birnbaum-
Saunders distributed random variable has positive value and its density is given
by
fTN (t;α, β) =
1
2
√
2piαβ
((
β
t
) 1
2
+
(
β
t
) 3
2
)
· exp
[
− 1
2α2
(
t
β
+
β
t
− 2
)]
.
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with α, β > 0 and 0 < t < ∞. Therefore, we conclude that the random
variable T
N˜
is approximately Birnbaum-Saunders distributed. And the EUA
futures price has the formula
Ft,T = P · Φ
(
1
α
[(
τ
β
) 1
2
−
(
β
τ
) 1
2
])
,
with parameters α =
√
η(N −G0,t)−1 and β = (N − G0,t)/ν. The EUA al-
lowance price is then given by
St = P e
−rτ · Φ
(
1
α
[(
τ
β
) 1
2
−
(
β
τ
) 1
2
])
.
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5Linking Systems and Effect of
Carbon Prices
5.1 Introduction
The issue to link emission trading schemes has been discussed and studied by
politicians, market regulators and scientists for several years. Linking means
to combine different emission trading schemes together so that emission certifi-
cates can be used in both of them for their compliance purposes. Nowadays
there are a number of emission trading schemes in many countries. Some of
them are advancing linking of their emission trading schemes, e.g. California
and Quebec. Some of them are discussing the proposal of doing it, e.g. EU
ETS and Swiss ETS; China ETS and Korea ETS. From the economic point of
view, linking different schemes would create larger market and help to obtain
significant benefit. First of all, linking means to strengthen international car-
bon markets, which would unlock further efficiencies and contribute to reducing
emission pollution cost-effectively. It provides the opportunity to achieve the
emission reduction goals by shifting reductions between both of the linked sys-
tems so that the total reduction costs can be minimized. Second, linking enlarge
the market for CO2 certificates so that the market liquidity can be improved.
A liquid market helps to reduce the carbon price volatility and ensure the mar-
ket stability. Moreover, to a certain extent linking systems can compensate for
regulatory defects of the carbon market and helps to achieve a collective emis-
sion target in a cost-efficient way. A over-allocated market may cause the price
collapse in a single trading system, but linking would reduce this risk. When
link two schemes with different prices, the price behavior of emission permits
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should plays the central role for the trading market. However, whether and how
prices vary depends on the way the systems are linked. Our research focuses
on this problem and tries to address the issue of the carbon price behavior as
well as the market balance of linking systems mathematically and economically.
In theory, companies with relative low abatement costs will choose to emit
less and sell surplus emission allowances on the carbon market, whereas compa-
nies with high abatement costs will choose to purchase allowances to cover their
emissions. Therefore, emissions reductions are undertaken in the most cost-
efficient way. Meanwhile, low cost abatement opportunities are geographically
spread over the globe, so that linking would help to deplete these opportunities
as far as possible and ensure the full cost-efficiency. For its theoretical explana-
tion see for example Edenhofer et al. in (EdFM 07), Anger et al. in (AnBO 09),
Mehling and Haites in (MehH 09) and Haites and Mehling in (HaiM 09). Link-
ing system for emission trading schemes has been discussed by some literature
from an economical point of view. Gru¨ll and Taschini in (GruT 12) use a sim-
ple model-free structure discuss the price behavior of linking systems under
different model settings. For the research of linking under equilibrium frame-
work, Barrieu and Fehr in (BarF 11) focus on arbitrage free price dynamics for
CERs and EUAs of the second compliance periods. They discuss the impact of
the regulation on the different emission certificates using an equilibrium model
and analyze the simulation methods of futures price processes. Similar research
on relationship between EUAs and CERs can be seen in Nazifi in (Nazi 10).
Besides, some empirical studies on linking schemes can be found in (JotB 09)
and (RanS 15).
This chapter is organized as follows. Based on the qualitative analysis of
Gru¨ll and Taschini in (GruT 12), we develop a market equilibrium model of
linking system on deterministic settings and investigate the price convergence
behavior of the model. In section 2, a model based on bilateral linking mecha-
nism will be established and analyzed. Then in section 3, a model of unilateral
setting will be developed and key results will be provided. Results of market
equilibrium position and price convergence behavior coincide with results in
(GruT 12), which corroborate their opinions from a quantitative standpoint.
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In section 4 we introduce the status of international linking systems and dis-
cuss their potential impacts.
5.2 Model of Bilateral Systems
We consider two emission trading schemes, both of them are using cap-and-
trade systems and are constructing a link depending on the regulation of al-
lowable permit transfer. The first option is to use the bilateral linking system.
A bilateral system allows permits to be traded in both schemes which means
the transfer of allowance permits is bidirectional. If two trading schemes with
different allowance prices are linked, a price convergence may take place. In
order to demonstrate this problem, an equilibrium model will be developed in
the following subsection.
5.2.1 Model description
Suppose two emission trading schemes ETS1 and ETS2 are to be linked under
the bilateral mechanism, where allowance permits can be transferred in both
directions. Following assumptions are made:
- The permit price processes in ETS1 and ETS2 are denoted by (At)t∈[0,T ]
and (Bt)t∈[0,T ] over a certain compliance period. A and B are the futures
prices with maturity at T , respectively.
- There is a finite set of agents, I, covered by the ETS1, which is different
from a finite set of agents, J , covered by ETS2.
- Each agent i ∈ I, j ∈ J will have some emissions Ei and Zj in the
corresponding compliance period, respectively.
- Each agent i ∈ I, j ∈ J will be allocated by a certain number of al-
lowances, denoted by Λi and Ψj at the beginning of the period, respec-
tively.
- Agent i can adjust its position by buying or selling φi ∈ R allowances in
ETS1 at price A. Similarly, j can buy or sell θj ∈ R allowances in ETS2
at price B.
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- γi and δj denote the amount of allowance permits, which i and j can buy
from or sell to the other market, respectively.
Furthermore, under the model assumptions, we set constraints for γi and δj
given by
Γ˜i ≤ γi ≤ Γi, ∆˜j ≤ δj ≤ ∆j .
The net amount for i and j at the end of the period are given by
αi = Λi + φi + γi − Ei and βj = Ψj + θj + δj − Zj ,
respectively. Moreover, we assume that each agent associates the net amount
αi and βj with a projected Profit-and-Loss function, denoted by A i(αi) and
Bj(βj). Therefore, each agent i has a cost function given by
L A,B,i(φi, γi) = φiA+ γi(A,B)−A i(αi) ∀i ∈ I,
while each agent j has a cost function given by
MA,B,j(θj , δj) = θjB + δj(A,B)−Bj(βj) ∀j ∈ J.
For our equilibrium modelling, some standard assumptions have to be made as
well:
Assumption 5.2.1. (i) αi 7→ A i(αi) and βj 7→ Bj(βj) are strong monotoni-
cally increasing, concave and continuously differentiable for i ∈ I and j ∈ J .
(ii) Γi > 0, Γ˜i < 0 for all i ∈ I. ∆j > 0, ∆˜j < 0 for all j ∈ J .
In the following, Si = R×[Γ˜i,Γi] denotes the feasible compliance strategy of any
agent i, and Sj = R× [∆˜j ,∆j ] denotes the feasible compliance strategy of any
agent j. Therefore, S = {(φ, γ, θ, δ)|(φi, γi) ∈ Si, (θj , δj) ∈ Sj , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J} is
the feasible compliance strategy for the overall market. Following the intuition
that every agent aims to minimize its own cost, we can define the market
equilibrium:
Definition 5.2.1. Prices (A∗, B∗) ∈ R2 and the compliance strategy for the
overall market (φ∗, γ∗, θ∗, δ∗) ∈ S form a market equilibrium, if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) All financial positions within each trading scheme are in zero net supply, i.e.∑
i∈I
φ∗i = 0,
∑
j∈J
θ∗j = 0.
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(ii) All financial positions between trading schemes are in zero net supply, i.e.∑
i∈I
γ∗i +
∑
j∈J
δ∗j = 0.
(iii) Agents i ∈ I and j ∈ J are satisfied with their own compliance strategies,
namely:
L A
∗,B∗,i(φ∗i, γ∗i) ≤ L A∗,B∗,i(φi, γi), ∀(φi, γi) ∈ Si,
MA
∗,B∗,j(θ∗j , δ∗j) ≤MA∗,B∗,j(θj , δj), ∀(θj , δj) ∈ Sj .
Moreover, to understand the price behavior and the market balance, we in-
troduce the following aggregated notations, variables and P&L functions given
by:
γ =
∑
i
γi, δ =
∑
j
δj , E =
∑
i
Ei, Z =
∑
j
Zj ,
Λ =
∑
i
Λi, Ψ =
∑
j
Ψj , Γ =
∑
i
Γi, ∆ =
∑
j
∆j ,
α =
∑
i
αi = Λ + γ − E, β =
∑
j
βj = Ψ + δ − Z,
A (α) = sup
(∑
i
A i(αi)
)
, B(β) = sup
∑
j
Bj(βj)
 .
So far, the model equilibrium setting is described and some important results,
such as equilibrium prices and the market position will be derived in the sub-
sequent subsection.
5.2.2 Model results
Suppose there is a representative planer who is responsible for regulating the
linking markets. The optimization problem for a representative planer can be
expressed as
inf
∑
i∈I
L A,B,i(φi, γi) +
∑
j∈J
MA,B,j(θj , δj)
 (5.1)
with constraints Γ˜ ≤ γ ≤ Γ, ∆˜ ≤ δ ≤ ∆ and −γ = δ. Note that this optimiza-
tion problem can be reformulated as:
infγ (−A (Λ + γ − E)−B(Ψ− γ − Z)) (5.2)
s.t. Γ˜− γ ≤ 0, γ − Γ ≤ 0, ∆˜ + γ ≤ 0, −γ −∆ ≤ 0.
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Due to assumptions described in the previous subsection, (5.2) with its con-
straints is a convex optimization problem. Therefore, its optimal solution γ¯
is given as a solution to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. More-
over, if we assume that ETS1 and ETS2 can trade their allowance permits
freely amongst each other and consider the aggregated planer problem given as
follows:
inf
∑
i∈I
L +
∑
j∈J
M

= inf
∑
i∈I
−A i(Λi − Ei + φi + γi) +
∑
j∈J
−Bj(Ψj − Zj + θj + δj)
(5.3)
s.t. Γ˜i ≤ γi ≤ Γi, ∆˜j ≤ δj ≤ ∆j , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J,∑
i
φi = 0,
∑
j
θj = 0,
∑
i
γi +
∑
j
δj = 0.
Then the market equilibrium can be proved and its equilibrium price can be
derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2.1. If the above assumption holds true and γ¯ is an optimal
solution for the representative problem, then we have the following results:
(i) The market equilibrium exits.
(ii) The equilibrium allowance prices in ETS1 and ETS2 are given by
A = A ′(Λ− E + γ¯), B = B′(Ψ− Z − γ¯),
respectively.
Proof. First, we solve the optimization problem of (5.2) with Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. The KKT conditions are given as follows:
(i) Stationary condition:
−A ′(Λ + γ − E) +B′(Ψ− γ − Z)− µ1 + µ2 + µ3 − µ4 = 0.
(ii) Complementary slackness condition:
µ1(Γ˜− γ) = 0, µ2(γ − Γ) = 0, µ3(∆˜ + γ) = 0, µ4(−γ −∆) = 0.
(iii) Primal feasibility:
Γ˜− γ ≤ 0, γ − Γ ≤ 0, ∆˜ + γ ≤ 0, −γ −∆ ≤ 0.
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(iv) Dual feasibility:
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3 ≥ 0, µ4 ≥ 0.
We denote o∗ ∈ R as the point which fulfills the condition
A ′(Λ + o∗ − E) = B′(Ψ− o∗ − Z),
and discuss the following different cases of the primal feasibility:
In case of γ = max(Γ˜,−∆), then from (ii) we have
γ − Γ = max(Γ˜− Γ,−∆− Γ) < 0 ⇒ µ2 = 0,
∆˜ + γ = max(Γ˜ + ∆˜, ∆˜−∆) < 0, ⇒ µ3 = 0,
and therefore, from (i) it yields
−A ′ +B′ − µ1 − µ4 = 0,
⇒ 0 ≤ µ1 + µ4 = −A ′(Λ + γ − E) +B′(Ψ− γ − Z).
Note that −A ′ +B′ is due to Assumption 5.2.1 strong and monotonically de-
creasing with respect to γ. And o∗ is the point fulfills the condition A ′(Λ +
o∗ − E) = B′(Ψ− o∗ − Z), then we have o∗ ≥ max(Γ˜,−∆).
In case of γ = min(Γ,−∆˜), then from (ii) we have
Γ˜− γ = Γ˜ +max(−Γ, ∆˜) = max(Γ˜− Γ, ∆˜ + Γ˜) < 0 ⇒ µ1 = 0,
−γ −∆ = max(−Γ, ∆˜)−∆ = max(−Γ−∆, ∆˜−∆) < 0 ⇒ µ4 = 0,
and therefore, from (i) it yields
−A ′ +B′ + µ2 + µ3 = 0,
⇒ 0 ≤ µ2 + µ3 = A ′(Λ + γ − E)−B′(Ψ− γ − Z).
Analogically, −A ′+B′ is strong and monotonically decreasing with respect to
γ, and therefore we have o∗ ≤ min(Γ,−∆˜).
In case of γ ∈ (Γ˜,Γ) and γ ∈ (−∆,−∆˜), then according to Assumption 5.2.1
we have
γ ∈ (max(Γ˜,−∆),min(Γ,−∆˜)).
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Then from (ii) it yields
γ ∈ (Γ˜,Γ) ⇒ µ1 = µ2 = 0,
γ ∈ (−∆,−∆˜) ⇒ µ3 = µ4 = 0.
Hence, we have
A ′(Λ + γ − E) = B′(Ψ− γ − Z),
⇒ γ = o∗.
Similarly, by using the same argument it is not difficult to show that the fol-
lowing cases do no exist:
Γ˜ < −∆ and γ ∈ [Γ˜,−∆);
−∆ < Γ˜ and γ ∈ [−∆, Γ˜);
Γ > −∆˜ and γ ∈ (−∆˜,−Γ];
−∆˜ > Γ and γ ∈ (Γ,−∆˜].
Therefore, the optimization problem of (5.2) can be solved at the point
γ¯ = min(o∗,min(Γ,−∆˜)) ∨max(Γ˜,−∆),
where o∗ denotes the unconstrained strategy, which fulfills the condition A ′(Λ+
o∗ − E) = B′(Ψ− o∗ − Z).
To show the existence of the market equilibrium, consider the aggregated planer
problem expressed in all individual constraints given by (5.3), which is also
equivalent to (5.1). The problem fulfills the Slater’s conditions. Hence, it has
optimal primal and dual solutions (φ¯i, γ¯i, θ¯i, δ¯i), (A¯, B¯) and the strong duality
holds. The optimal value of (5.1) is denoted by p∗, then the weak duality implies
that:
sup
(A,B)∈R2
 inf
(φi,γi,θi,δi)∈S
∑
i
L A,B,i(φi, γi) +
∑
j
MA,B,j(θj , δj)

= sup
(A,B)∈R2
∑
i
inf
(φi,γi)∈Si
L A,B,i(φi, γi) +
∑
j
inf
(θi,δi)∈Sj
MA,B,j(θj , δj)

=
∑
i
(
inf
(φi,γi)∈Si
L A¯,B¯,i(φi, γi)
)
+
∑
j
(
inf
(θi,δi)∈Sj
M A¯,B¯,j(θj , δj)
)
≤
∑
i
L A¯,B¯,i(φ¯i, γ¯i) +
∑
j
M A¯,B¯,j(θ¯j , δ¯j)
=p∗.
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Due to the strong duality, the inequality holds with equality as well, so we also
have: ∑
i
L A¯,B¯,i(φ¯i, γ¯i) +
∑
j
M A¯,B¯,j(θ¯j , δ¯j)
=
∑
i
inf
(φi,γi)∈Si
L A¯,B¯,i(φi, γi) +
∑
j
inf
(θi,δi)∈Sj
M A¯,B¯,j(θj , δj)
≤
∑
i
L A¯,B¯,i(φi, γi) +
∑
j
M A¯,B¯,j(θj , δj).
Thus we have
L A¯,B¯,i(φ¯i, γ¯i) ≤ L A¯,B¯,i(φi, γi),
M A¯,B¯,j(θ¯j , δ¯j) ≤M A¯,B¯,j(θj , δj),
and the existence of the market equilibrium is proved.
Figure 5.1: Price convergence behavior in a bilateral linking system
Figure 5.1 illustrates the price convergence behavior in a bilateral system. In
the case of bilateral-linking, emission allowance permits will flow from the low
to the high price regime. This will cause a price convergence towards each other
until they coincide, as long as the transfer volume is sufficient as illustrated in
the first case. For a linking system with import limits or trade restrictions, the
different prices in each ETS will still move towards each other until the point
where the maximum allowable permits have been transferred. If this occurs be-
fore the prices coincide, there will be two different prices in each trading scheme
as shown in the second case.
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5.3 Model of Unilateral Systems
Unlike the bilateral linking system, a unilateral system allows allowance per-
mits to be traded only in one direction. In case that different prices of permits
are traded in both markets, a price convergence behavior is also expected and
its corresponding equilibrium model is to be developed in this section.
5.3.1 Model description
Suppose that the administrator of ETS1 establishes a unilateral link with ETS2
and accepts allowance permits from ETS2 for the compliance purpose of their
agents. However, it is not possible for agents in ETS2 to use permits form ETS1
for their compliance. Intuitively, based on the model results of a bilateral sys-
tem in the previous section, one can expect that the allowance price converges
uni-directionally.
In this case, all definitions of permit prices A,B, agents i ∈ I, j ∈ J , their
emissions Ei, Zj , allocated allowances Λi,Ψj , and internal trading positions
φi, θj remain the same as defined in the previous section. Since allowances can
only flow in one direction, the potential trading volumes φi ∈ R and θj ∈ R
from ETS2 to ETS1 have the following constraints:
0 ≤ γi ≤ Γi, ∆˜j ≤ δj ≤ 0.
The net amount of agents αi and βj remain the same, so that the formulations
of their projected Profit-and-Lost functions A i(αi) and Bj(βj) as well as the
cost functionsL A,B,i(φi, γi) andMA,B,j(θj , δj) are unchanged. For equilibrium
modelling consider the assumption as follows:
Assumption 5.3.1. (i) αi 7→ A i(αi) and βj 7→ Bj(βj) are monotonically
increasing, concave and continuously differentiable for i ∈ I and j ∈ J .
(ii) Γi > 0, for all i ∈ I. ∆˜j < 0, for all j ∈ J .
Let Si = R× [0,Γi] and Sj = R× [∆˜j , 0] be the feasible compliance strategies
of any agent i and j, respectively. And S = {(φ, γ, θ, δ)|(φi, γi) ∈ Si, (θj , δj) ∈
Sj ,∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J} be the feasible compliance strategy for the overall market.
Furthermore, Definition 5.2.1 is also used for the unilateral system and prices
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(A∗, B∗) ∈ R2 together with the compliance strategy (φ∗, γ∗, θ∗, δ∗) ∈ S form a
market equilibrium.
Keeping the notations of aggregated amount γ, δ, E, Z,Λ,Ψ,Γ,∆, α, β,A (α),
and B(β) unchanged as defined in the previous section. Under the model as-
sumptions, the optimization problem for a representative planer can be ex-
pressed as
inf
∑
i∈I
L A,B,i(φi, γi) +
∑
j∈J
MA,B,j(θj , δj)
 (5.4)
with constraints 0 ≤ γ ≤ Γ, ∆˜ ≤ δ ≤ 0 and −γ = δ. And the optimization
problem can be also reformulated as:
infγ (−A (Λ + γ − E)−B(Ψ− γ − Z)) (5.5)
s.t. 0 ≤ γ ≤ Γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ −∆˜.
5.3.2 Model results
Similarly, the problem of market equilibrium (5.5) is a convex optimization
problem and its optimal solution γ¯ is given as a solution to the KKT condition.
The following proposition can be proved:
Proposition 5.3.1. Let γ¯ be an optimal solution for the representative problem.
Then
(i) the market equilibrium exits.
(ii) the equilibrium allowance prices in ETS1 and ETS2 are given by
A = A ′(Λ− E + γ¯), B = B′(Ψ− Z − γ¯).
Proof. Only the proof idea will be provided. The optimization problem fulfills
Slater’s condition and therefore its optimal solution is given as a solution to the
KKT conditions given by
(i) Stationary condition:
−A ′(Λ + γ − E) +B′(Ψ− γ − Z)− λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = 0.
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(ii) Complementary slackness condition:
λ1γ = 0, λ2(γ − Γ) = 0, λ3(γ + ∆˜) = 0.
(iii) Primal feasibility:
−γ ≤ 0, γ − Γ ≤ 0, γ + ∆˜ ≤ 0.
(iv) Dual feasibility:
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0.
Solving this problem, it is not difficult to see that
γ¯ = max(0,min(o∗,Γ))
is the optimal solution, where o∗ fulfills the condition A ′(Λ−E+o∗) = B′(Ψ−
Z − o∗). Therefore, o∗ determines the optimal trading volume from ETS2 to
ETS1 and the corresponding allowances permit price is determined as well.
The proof of existence of the market equilibrium is similar as the proof for the
bilateral system.
Intuitively, the market will find the optimal trading volume between the
two markets, and the price of allowance will converge in both market. How-
ever, if one of the constraints of trading volume is reached, the price movement
in each system will be stopped and there will be different prices in each mar-
kets. In case of simplicity, suppose Γ ≤ ∆˜. We plotted in Figure 5.2 the price
convergence for this situation. The price behavior is basically quite similar as
in the previous case for the bilateral system. Since the transfer of allowances
occurs unidirectional, the opposite direction for the flow is not allowable. If the
transfer direction is from the high-price scheme to the low-price scheme, then
no transfer will take place as shown in the last case. However, this case can
be considered as a special case in the bilateral system with zero transfer limit
regulation.
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Figure 5.2: Price convergence behavior in a unilateral linking system
5.4 International Background and Outlook
The purpose of linking emission trading systems, either domestically or inter-
nationally, is to establish a larger carbon market and form a uniform price for
emissions. The benefits of creating larger market is obvious. First, it helps
to achieve emission abatement in a cost efficient way. Market participants in
the system with higher abatement costs will flow to the one with lower abate-
ment costs automatically. Second, a larger carbon market will provide better
liquidity and therefore reduce the price volatility. Finally, merge different inter-
national markets will help to create a single price in both of the systems, weaken
the competitiveness, so that the risk of carbon leakage can be reduced or even
avoided. Therefore, with more emission trading systems emerging worldwide,
linking systems are also implemented and more discussions on this issue are
brought on the table.
Generally, linking can be categorized into bilateral and unilateral mech-
anisms, depending on the way how carbon certificates are permitted to flow
between the systems. Currently, there are already implemented linking sys-
tems and systems in plan.
Key implemented linking systems
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the first emission trading
programme in the United States, started with its first three-year compliance pe-
riod in 2009. It includes the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The
programme is set up through a memorandum of understanding as a combination
of nine individual ETSs that are linked with each other directly. Each partici-
pating state has its own regulation based on the Model Rule provided by RGGI.
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California’s cap-and-trade programme came into force officially on 1 January
2013, although the auction for California Carbon Allowances (CCAs) was held
earlier in November 2012. At the same time, Quebec’s cap-and-trade pro-
gramme was also launched. As of 1 January 2014, Quebec’s bilateral linkage
with California’s cap-and-trade programme allows regulated entities to trade
carbon permits across both jurisdictions. In this linkage, participants in each
market can use both emission allowances and offsets issued by either Quebec
or California.
The use of international credits from Kyoto Protocol by the EU ETS can
be also seen as an indirect unilateral link, since emission reduction projects of
CDM and JI and EU ETS have mutual recognition of their carbon certificates
created by them. The legal foundation of using international credits is the Link-
ing Directive adopted in 2004 (EU 04), in which the EU allows the limited use
of offset credits from JI and CDM projects to be used to cover emissions in the
EU. Since then, operators of EU ETS begin to invest in the CDM projects. And
this results 670 million CERs of 1.06 billion international credits in total used
during the second trading phase. Therefore, in the third trading phase, the use
of international credits is under regulated more stringently. As a result, the de-
mand for CERs dropped drastically and this caused the priced collapse of CERs.
Indirect unilateral link are also between CDM and JI projects and the New
Zealand emissions trading system. Since the beginning of the scheme in 2010,
around 90% of units surrendered to meet New Zealand ETS obligations were
from the international credits. With no restrictions on the quantum of inter-
national units, it resulted in a large bank of allowances of the domestic trading
system.
Key linking systems in plan
Western Climate Initiative (WCI), established in 2008, is a North American re-
gional initiative including the US State of California and the Canadian provinces
Quebec, British Columbia, Ontario and Manitoba. It aims to provide adminis-
trative and technical services to support the implementation of regional emis-
sions trading schemes and to facilitate future linkage between the schemes.
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Currently only California and Quebec linked their emission trading systems
since 2014. Ontario planed to link their cap-and-trade programme with the
existing linking system in its early years. Manitoba announced the implemen-
tation of an ETS that will be designed to be linked with the existing California
and Quebec systems at the COP 21.
The Swiss ETS started in 2008 with a five-year voluntary phase, where
emission allowances are traded only on a voluntary basis. Since January 2013,
revised regulations entered into force in the Swiss ETS and the system became
mandatory, mainly for the domestic energy intensive sector. Switzerland is cur-
rently negotiating with EU on linking both of their emission trading systems
bilaterally. To achieve this purpose, many elements of the Swiss ETS have been
designed to match provisions of the EU ETS from 2013.
China launched 7 pilot emission trading schemes in different provinces and
cities from 2013 to 2015 as a part of its 12th Five-Year Plan ran from 2011 to
2015. A national ETS is planned to be established in the second half of 2017
by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the central re-
gulator of the upcoming national ETS. With the establishment of the Chinese
national ETS, it will be potentially the worlds largest emission trading system
and will cover around 50% of total domestic emissions, accounts for around
12% of total global emissions. To establish the national ETS, one significant
issue is to build multilateral link to all pilot markets and connect them to the
national ETS as well. The NDRC is coordinating with different stakeholders
in designing such domestic linking system. Besides, the NDRC is exploring the
possibility of linking the national ETS with other ETSs around the world at an
appropriate time in the future.
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6.1 Results of the thesis
Global warming due to the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gases has
gained wide consensus from the scientific community. To stabilize the green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere, market-based policy instruments
are considered as effective solutions. Among these, the cap-and-trade systems
are very popular and have been established over the globe. In most carbon mar-
kets, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has the largest
scale and its benchmark product, the EUA futures contract, is largely traded.
Research on EUA price behavior is therefore an important topic.
In the present research for pricing the carbon permits, martingales finishing
at two-valued random variables can be considered as an useful tool to evaluate
the risk neutral futures price dynamics of EUA, since it is able to cover most
important regulations of EU ETS. From the original studies of Carmona and
Hinz in (CarH 11), a reduced-form model for two-valued martingales is flexible
in terms of time- and space changing volatility and supposed to be capable
to match the observed historical or implied volatility of the underlying futures
contract. A crucial step in the calibration of the model is to transform the
observed futures prices into a Gaussian process by changing the probability
measure.
However, statistical tests show non-Gaussian property of such a Gaussian
process. This gives us the idea to extend the model by taking into account a
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dynamic market price of risk in order to improve the calibration quality. By ap-
plying a bivariate model with a time series for the implied market price of risk,
it is able to calibrate the extended model with extensive historical traded data.
Generally, futures prices of carbon permits carry forward-looking information
of market participants and this information can be revealed by the values of
the risk premia the investors attach to the carbon certificates. Estimate results
of the bivariate model show a negative correlation between the futures prices
and the risk premia. This reflects the fact that the more risky the investment
in EUA futures is, the higher the additional expected rate of return should be.
Therefore, in order to achieve a higher required rate of return, the EUA futures
must be discounted and thus sold at a lower price to investors.
Moreover, EUA options written on the futures are traded for many years al-
though no theoretical foundation for their pricing is available yet. The bivariate
model provides also option valuation schemes. The option price formula derived
in Chapter 4 is not available in a closed form, but can be applied simply by
using numerical integration. Compared with the original model with constant
market price of risk, it can be found that EUA option prices are underestimated
before a certain time point and then overestimated after that time point. This
is because the implied risk premia increase with time and will exceed their
average level to a certain time. Thereafter, asset prices must be discounted to
compensate the relative higher risk for investors.
Follow the basic idea that allowance prices should be explained as the prob-
ability of shortage multiplied by the penalty studied by Carmona et al. in
(CFHP 10), it is possible to derive the spot price of emission certificates by
modelling the cumulative emission process. For this purpose, some appropriate
estimation methods have to be applied. (CheT 12) and (GruK 10) performed
some approximation approaches to model the emission rate, then the cumula-
tive emissions are given by the integration on the rate. This thesis discussed
another approximative approach by modelling the emission process directly via
looking into a stochastic subordinator. Under concrete model assumptions, the
spot price of permits can be derived in a simple form. However, appropriate
parameter estimation methods are required for further use.
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Looking at the issue of emission trading from an international perspective,
linking emission trading systems has become significant since more cap-and-
trade systems are already launched or are planned to be established over the
globe. Linkage under different regulations could cause different price beha-
vior. Their qualitative analysis has been conducted by Gru¨ll and Taschini in
(GruT 12). This thesis develops a market equilibrium model on deterministic
settings and investigates the price convergence behavior of carbon certificates
in trading schemes to be linked. The model results coincide with the qualitative
analysis of Gru¨ll and Taschini. It shows that under unlimited trading restric-
tions, permit prices will converge to a single one. But in the presence of trading
restrictions, different prices will move towards each other until the maximum
allowable trading volume has been transferred. If this happens before the two
prices converge, the result will be two differently-priced schemes with no flow
of permits between them.
6.2 Key findings
Key findings of the thesis include:
• Stochastic reduced form model is proven to be useful to model the al-
lowance permit prices observed in the trading market of EU ETS. Espe-
cially the model based on a two-valued martingale forms the risk neutral
futures price dynamics and captures the main properties of the market
mechanism.
• To evaluate the return that the market wants as compensation for taking
the risk, it is possible to extract the information of the market price of
risk by applying an extended pricing model.
• The EUA option price can be derived by the extended model, carrying
extra information of a dynamic, time-varying market price of risk.
• EUA futures price can be modeled by modelling the aggregative cumula-
tive emissions directly. However, appropriate parameter estimate method
has to be determined.
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• Price behavior of linking systems can be explained quantitatively by a
static equilibrium model. Prices in different trading schemes will converge
unless special constraints are set, such as limiting the transaction volume
between the schemes.
6.3 Further research
Based on the current results of this thesis, further research activities can be
focused from the following aspects:
• The allowance permit price dynamics of EU ETS can be analyzed based
on the current basic model, but capturing more properties of the mar-
ket design, such as including the potential effects of the market stability
reserve.
• Pricing model of a linking system can be investigated in a dynamic frame-
work, in which price development can be studied during runtime.
• Furthermore, some fundamental analysis on the price modelling can be
conducted by examining the related economic, financial and other quali-
tative and quantitative factors affecting the EUA prices. This would be a
helpful supplement to the financial modelling of emission allowance prices.
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